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1 INTRODUCTION
The bay-trees in our country all are wither’d
And meteors fright the fixed stars of heaven;
The pale-faced moon looks bloody on the earth
And leant-lookt prophets whisper fearful change;
Rich men look sad and ruffians dance and leap, -
The one in fear to lose what they enjoy,
The other to enjoy by rage and war:
These signs forerun the death or fall of kings.
Shakespeare, King Richard the Second, Act II, Scene IV1
1.1 Background
The beginning quote from the Shakespearean play King Richard the Second describes well
the uncertainty met by the kings of the world market, the multinational firms, in the warfare
they conduct with each other on the pursuit for market share dominance. The world market
tolerates no weakness, and going on in total war with each other may be the end for both of
the competing firms.
This Master’s thesis focuses on competitive strategies of multinational firms. The key areas
of interest are multinational competition, firm behaviour, and games that the firms play in
order to win the most market space. The theories are tested in practise by examining the
battle between Microsoft and Sony in the game consoles market. In this first section, I am
explaining my motivation, my goals, and the structure for this thesis.
Competitive strategies of the firms are a concern for both antitrust regulators and business
1Shakespeare, W. (1996). In The complete works of William Shakespeare, Wordsworth Editions Limited,
Kent: UK, p. 372. Original work published approximately 1595.
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managers (Scherer, 1980; Barney, 1986). The first party needs to make certain that the com-
petition remains socially fair, whereas the second party is interested in maximizing profits
(Scherer, 1980). Although this thesis is written in the spirit of strategic management, and
therefore eventually aims to offer normative advice to the profit maximising managers, the
knowledge of the firm behaviour provided in this thesis could as well be used by the antitrust
regulators (Barney, 1986).
The literature on multimarket competition and firm behaviour draws mainly from three re-
search traditions. The first school of thought is industrial organization, which examines su-
pernormal profit opportunities for the firms in imperfectly structured markets (Scherer, 1980;
Barney, 1986). Secondly, the relatively newer research stream of resource-based view of the
firm adds firm’s internal resources and capabilities to the analysis (Collis and Montgomery,
1995; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Finally, the research tradition of international
business explores opportunities and challenges for conducting business in the global scale
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1985, 1989). The section 2.1 of this thesis reviews the historical con-
text further.
The theories of multimarket competition and firm behaviour are addressed in the literature
review in the section 2.2 of this thesis. Most notably, this thesis leans on the industrial or-
ganization -based research program of competitive dynamics, a school developed to model
the interactions between a pair of aggressively competing firms (cf. Chen, 2009). A concep-
tual framework synthesizing the theories can be found from the section 2.3. The conceptual
framework aims to fit the theories of multimarket competition to the global level, present-
ing a dynamic model for multinational firms from antecedents to competition to choices of
competitive actions.
The conceptual framework is tested with the empirical game consoles example. The case
examines the seventh generation of game consoles, which is usually seen to contain the
American Microsoft with the Xbox 360 (from now on, Xbox), the Japanese Sony with the
PlayStation 3 (PS3), and the Japanese Nintendo with the Wii (cf. ESRB, 2012). However,
in my empirical study I concentrate only on the competitive actions between Microsoft and
Sony as their game consoles and the target consumer segments differ significantly from Nin-
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tendo’s.
A product market is defined by Jayanchandran et al. (1999, p. 50) as a set of goods or
services that serves similar functions, is created by the use of similar technology, and is used
by similar consumers. Out of the three console makers in the market Microsoft’s Xbox and
Sony’s PS3 are closest to each other in terms of the types of games offered for the consoles,
and especially in terms of the gamers who buy the consoles. Hence, the two firms can be seen
to form a pair of rivals, a dyad, which is the unit of analysis of the mainstream competitive
dynamics research (Ferrier, 2001; Yu and Cannella, 2007; Chen, 2009).
The data used in this study comprises the game console market in its seventh generation
from 2007 to 2012. Nintendo is already moving on to the eight generation with their Wii U
launched in the fourth quarter of the year 2012 (Nintendo, 2013c). While Sony has recently
announced the eight generation PS4 to be launched in the end of 2013 (Fitzimmons, 2013),
Microsoft is still claiming they are not going to launch a new console any time soon (Chacks-
field, 2012; Rivington, 2013). Differing product life cycles further justifies leaving Nintendo
Wii outside the discussion in this thesis (cf. section 2.2.1). The empirical case study between
the two companies conducted in this thesis is examined further in the chapter three.
I utilize the method of quantitative content analysis to collect primary data for the study fol-
lowing the previous research in the competitive dynamics stream (e.g. Ferrier, 2001; Derfus
et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2009). This thesis also addresses the methodological issues related
to modelling complex competitive data with several variables and non-normal variances (cf.
Nair and Selover, 2012). Chernoff faces are a statistical tool used to depict data by a computer
generated picture of a face (Chernoff, 1973). I suggest that the faces can be used in addition
to the regular statistical tools in order to provide a more accurate and visually helpful picture
of the complex data. The methodology of the empirical study is introduced in the chapter
four of this thesis.
In this thesis I try to find evidence for recognizable patterns of firm behaviour by examin-
ing the strategy-formulation of the game consoles manufacturers. The results from the data
analysis can be found from the chapter five, and the consequent synthesis of the theoretical
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framework and the statistical evidence form the basis for the discussion in the chapter six.
Finally, I summarize the findings and conclude the discussion in the seventh chapter of this
thesis.
1.2 Gaps and research problem
This section discusses the trends in the current research, and tries to determine and justify the
focus for this thesis by considering the main gaps in the literature. The research problem for
this thesis is presented at the end of this section.
Because the research background of the competitive behaviour of global firms comes from
several different streams as discussed above, it is important to try to further synthesise the
research to form a cohesive theoretical basis (Ma, 1998; Chen and Stucker, 1997). Both Ma
(1998) and Chen and Stucker (1997) call for studies combining the industrial organization
-based competition dynamics stream and international business studies.
One major gap in the previous research of competitive strategy formulation has been in the
scope of the research (Ma, 1998). Much research on the competitive interactions is conducted
on the national level, concentrating on the firms functioning in the United States (Chen and
Stucker, 1997; Yu and Cannella, 2007). Chen and Stucker (1997) further assess that in global
studies the assumptions of homogenous markets and cultures can be problematic, and there-
fore the context of multinational firms should be studied more carefully. Global research on
firm behaviour includes Ito and Rose (2002)’s study of the global tyre market (cf. also Rose
and Ito, 2009). Yu et al. (2009) (cf. also Yu and Cannella, 2007) is an example of a study of
the global car manufacturers. These studies are further examined in the following literature
review.
Ma (1998) criticizes that the industrial organization -based literature tends to concentrate on
market level variables such as concentration, and suggests that firm level variables such as
firm resources should be looked at in more detail. Additionally, many of the studies consider
multiple industries, multiple firms, and multiple products rather than any specific cases (Ma,
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1998). Although the results can be generalizable to some extent, these studies may forego
details that can be found from looking into specific cases (ibid.).
Some scholars call after finer-grained and finer-focused studies, which would look into spe-
cific firm and industry characteristics concentrating on the relative positions of the rival firms
(Chen, 1996; Ma, 1998). A recent example moving away from the general direction of the
inquiry in the competitive dynamics field is the study of the competition between Pepsi and
Coca-Cola by Nair and Selover (2012). Nevertheless, the authors concentrate their analysis
only on two domestic US markets, still displaying the tendency to look into the traditionally
examined national markets (cf. Nair and Selover, 2012).
The studies discussing such heavy manufacturing goods as tyres and cars are more common
(e.g. Ito and Rose, 2002; Yu and Cannella, 2007), whereas those studies related to high-tech
products are still rare (cf. Young et al., 1996, for an exception). Services are considered often
in the form of airlines or banking in the United States (e.g. Gimeno, 2002). These fields are
often examined because of tradition and extensive and accessible databases collected over the
years (cf. Gimeno and Woo, 1999). Thus looking into new types of product markets could be
beneficial.
Gimeno and Woo (1999) warn that the global context poses major uncertainty factors and
complications for modelling. For example, the authors trying to synthesize competitive dy-
namics and international business (Ma, 1998; Gimeno and Woo, 1999; Yu et al., 2009) ques-
tion the corporate level examination of the strategies and suggest along with the networking
theories of international business that the communication and control between the corporate
level and the subsidiary level may be less smooth than expected. Consequently they sug-
gest that competition between multinational firms should be looked on the subsidiary level
(ibid.).
The usual method for the competitive dynamics researchers is to collect the data with struc-
tured content analysis, and then perform econometric data analysis with the data (e.g. Ferrier,
2001; Derfus et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2009). Another approach is to examine the interactions
of the firms with a game theoretic model (Camerer, 1991; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
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Game theory offers interesting basis for examining reactions and interactions of the firms, and
could possibly help with a formulation of a better model for the study of strategic reactions
(ibid.).
While the game theoretic approach has been criticized to be too difficult to use (Camerer,
1991), many econometric results are based on such statistical methods, which are biased for
data with non-normal errors (e.g. Goldfeld-Quandt test in Nair and Selover, 2012). Also,
the regular regression analyses are based on the central limit theorem, which states that there
need to be enough well behaving observations in the data (Wooldridge, 2009). The issues with
the data analysis mean that there is no single statistical procedure, which could be generally
applied in the competitive analysis studies (cf. Yu and Cannella, 2007). The methods in the
studies tend not to be comparable with each other, resulting in non-comparable results as well
(ibid.).
This thesis bridges the theories of competitive dynamics and international business in study-
ing a single global dyad Microsoft and Sony. The case market has not been used as an
example of the competitive analysis previously, although the case is an excellent example of
a global competitive pair of firms. This study continues the tradition to examine the firms
in the global corporate level as there are no previous global studies on the game console
market, but recognizes the need for further studies in the subsidiary level for the reasons
reviewed above. Additionally, in order to produce more reliable statistical inferences, this
thesis also introduces Chernoff faces as a new method for comparing the strategic reactions
of the firms.
The main research problem can therefore be presented as
How does the competition between Microsoft and Sony compare to the previous
research on other types of businesses and market settings, and how could the
data be presented so that the reliability of the statistical inferences would be
improved?
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1.3 Research objectives and questions
In order to find answers to the research problem formulated above, the research objectives
outlining this thesis are to
Chapter two: Review the literature on multimarket competition and present a synthesized
theoretical framework of competitive interactions for global firms based on the previous re-
search.
Chapter three: Examine the game consoles market in order to study its characteristics
and introduce the players, and form hypotheses based on the theoretical framework and the
case.
Chapter four: Research the interactions between the players by conducting a structured
content analysis, and introduce the methods used in the statistical data analysis.
Chapter five: Run a statistical data-analysis including Chernoff faces, and report the re-
sults.
Chapter six: Model the competition between Microsoft and Sony, and assess the usability
of the Chernoff faces in the analysis of competitive interactions.
Based on the research problem and the objectives, I have formulated the following research
questions for this thesis.
1. How do Microsoft and Sony compete against each other?
2. How could Chernoff faces be used to help to model player reactions in globally com-
petitive markets?
In order to answer the first question, I plan to find out which strategies the game consoles
manufacturers use in competing against each other, and how these strategies differ from those
found in the previous research on strategic interactions. The second question is answered
by examining the faces generated from the data, and comparing the results with the more
generally used statistical tools.
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This first chapter has introduced my thesis subject, and placed it in the fields of competitive
dynamics and international business. I have presented my research problem, objectives of
the study, and research questions in the sections 1.2 and 1.3. In the next chapter of this
thesis, I review and compare the relevant literature, and at the end of the chapter I present my
conceptual framework of the competitive actions for a multinational firm-dyad.
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Figure 1: Literature review outline
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this thesis I look into competitive patterns between multinational corporations (MNCs).
This is the domain of global strategy, where the previous researchers have found that corpo-
rate players engage in an endless but often very subtle war over market share (cf. Karnani
and Wernerfelt, 1985; Upson et al., 2012). The competitive dynamics researchers suggest
that competition between two multinationals in the same business area is a game of action
and reaction, which occurs when the internal firm resources and the external industry factors
for the companies align (e.g. Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001).
The purpose of this literature review is to synthesize and summarize the literature. On the
basis of the previous research and my research problem, I aim to contribute to the literature
by presenting a theoretical framework depicting competition between two multinational firms
at the end of this chapter. In the following pages I attempt to uncover the subject of global
competition in multiple markets by discussing the most relevant pieces of work from the
fields of industrial organization, competitive dynamics, and international business.
Figure 1 describes the outline for the literature review. This chapter has been divided into
three sections. The first section describes the historical background for the concepts of com-
petition and strategy. The second section presents the literature on the subject of multimarket
competition. The third section summarizes the findings from the literature and introduces my
conceptual framework.
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2.1 About competition and strategy
Before I deliberate the specific theories of competition and strategy in multiple markets, it is
important to discuss the concepts of competition and strategy from a wider angle than my the-
sis subject in order to place my research in context with the different research streams.
As discussed in the introduction, the subject of multimarket competition leans mainly on
three research traditions of industrial organization, resource-based view of the firm (RBV),
and international business (Barney, 1986; Ma, 1998). Specifically, the research programs
based on game theory (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Camerer, 1991), strategic groups (cf.
Chen, 1996), and competitive dynamics (e.g. Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001) have been used to
examine multimarket competition. In this section I briefly describe the ways in which each
stream sees competition and strategy.
The classical economics literature explains firms and their formation as a channel for demand
and supply conditions of national markets (Scherer, 1980). The discussion moved on from
national markets to specific industry contexts in the 1960s, forming the basis for the industrial
organization studies (Barney, 1986; John et al., 1997). The general consensus was that those
markets where monopolistic or oligopolistic firms had market power needed to be regulated
by the antitrust, finance, and other governmental authorities (Scherer, 1980; John et al., 1997;
Ma, 1998).
The focus of the studies moved from government intervention to firm management and per-
formance through the 1980s, when normative scholars such as Caves and Porter started giving
out advice to firms on how to best succeed given their capabilities and industry conditions
(Barney, 1986; John et al., 1997). The shift in focus was due to the early 1980s invasion
of superior business models of the Japanese firms in the global markets, which had been
previously dominated by the multinational companies from the United States (Hamel and
Prahalad, 1985, 1989).
Industrial organization’s structure-conduct-performance paradigm plays an important role in
the multimarket literature (cf. Scherer, 1980; Barney, 1986; Camerer, 1991; Ferrier et al.,
2002). The framework implies that firm’s competitive position (strategy), and subsequent
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performance (financial returns) depend on the characteristics of the industry structure (Bar-
ney, 1986). These include barriers to entry, the number of the firms in the industry, the relative
size of the firms in the industry, the degree of differentiation of the products, and the elasticity
of demand for the products (ibid.).
Another important research stream influencing the multimarket literature is resource-based
view of the firm (RBV) (Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Chen, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1999).
Whereas classical economics discussed nations, and industrial economics considered indus-
try, RBV concentrates on firm as the unit of analysis (Chen, 1996).
RBV combines the internal capabilities and resources of the firm with the external compet-
itive environment of the industry (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). Any firm is built on its
experiences, acquired skills, and organizational culture, which makes every firm unique even
if their products are homogeneous (Barney, 1986; Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Street et al.,
2010). According to RBV, a competitive advantage is any valuable resource that enables the
company to offer their product in a better way than that of the competitors (Collis and Mont-
gomery, 1995). However, competitive advantage is often dynamic, depreciating over time,
and always related to a specific industry context (ibid.).
International business researchers apply the theories from industrial organization economics
and RBV to the international business context (Ma, 1998). In the subject areas of competi-
tion and strategy, the researchers have been especially interested in network effects between
international partners/competitors (ibid.), the subsidiary level (Yu et al., 2009), and entry
strategies (Ito and Rose, 2002; Rose and Ito, 2009).
Game theory, popularized in the 1990s, offers a way of analysing competition and strategies
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). The purpose of a game theoretical analysis is to try
to predict the moves of the other players as far as possible, and shape the game accordingly
(ibid.). Traditional criticism of game theory has been that it is difficult to apply, it does not
result in generalizable results, and it assumes too much rationality (Camerer, 1991). Camerer
(1991) counters all of these, but amends that game theoretic strategy models are still not easy
to come up with.
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An alternative research program examining the competitiveness of the firms is the strategic
group literature, which tries to challenge the firm-level analysis by moving on to strategic
groups, where the players inside an industry are clustered into different groups according
to their strategies (cf. Chen, 1996). However, Chen (1996) criticizes the strategic group
research’s assumptions of homogenous firms inside a group, and concludes that it should not
be used for examining competition between firms.
The most crucial but notoriously difficult aspect of competitive markets is uncertainty (Bar-
ney, 1986). Schumpeterian competition states that competition is dynamic and uncertain, and
that uncertainty means that luck determines which products and services are best received by
the future generation (ibid.). Based on the ideas of Schumpeterian competition, Chen (1996,
2009) and his fellow scholars (e.g. Baum and Korn, 1999; Ferrier, 2001) have formed the
competitive dynamics stream, which leads the recent advances in the strategy and competi-
tion research.
Competitive dynamics researchers study rivalry between pairs of firms drawing both from
industrial economics and RBV (Chen, 1996). Out of the research streams discussed in this
section, this thesis mostly leans on the research tradition of competitive dynamics.
2.2 Research on multimarket competition
Figure 2 below displays the outline for this section. The section starts by a review of the
key concepts of the study. It is followed by an examination of the most prominent literature
discussing competition in multiple markets highlighting and contrasting the most relevant
theories. The section ends by a discussion of empirical examples.
2.2.1 Key concepts
The key concepts examined in this section are multimarket competition, competitive strate-
gies, hypercompetition, and Schumpeter’s creative destruction.
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Figure 2: Multimarket competition literature outline
Multimarket competition defines the type of competition examined in this thesis. Instead of
looking into the competition between multiple firms in one market, I am looking into cases
where two firms meet and compete in more than one market cf. Karnani and Wernerfelt
(1985). This study is also interested in how firms use competitive strategies to improve their
competitive positions (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Upson et al., 2012), and what types of
strategies exist in the global market for game consoles between Microsoft and Sony.
Hypercompetition is the term used of market settings, where competitive advantage is diffi-
cult to hold on to given the levels of uncertainty (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). The global
market for technological products such as game consoles is a good candidate for a hyper-
competitive market (ibid.). Finally, I look into the driving force behind the inquiry in the
competitive dynamics research, Schumpeter’s creative destruction, which states that firms
need to innovate constantly in order to survive in the market place (Barney, 1986).
Multimarket competition
Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) define multiple point competition as an instance where two
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or more firms engage in competition simultaneously in multiple markets, for example with
the same product in multiple geographic markets. The terms multiple point competition or
multiple market competition are most often used by the international business and strategic
management researchers, whereas the industrial organization researchers tend to use multi-
market competition (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Ma, 1998). In this thesis the terms are
used as synonyms, although multimarket competition is the preferred term.
Gimeno and Woo (1999) suggest that more alike the competing companies are, the more
likely the multimarket contact as both companies seek economies of scope, and inevitably
end up in the same markets due to limitations in the world’s market space. However, it is
important to notice that even if the companies are present in the same markets, it does not yet
mean that they are engaging in competition with each other (Chen and Stucker, 1997; Ma,
1998).
In order to combine competition and multimarket contact, Chen and Stucker (1997) discuss
the concept of cross-border competitive engagement. Cross-border competitive engagement
occurs when two or more firms meet in multiple markets, and are both able and motivated
to engage in retaliatory or collusive actions with each other (Chen and Stucker, 1997; Ma,
1998). Thus cross-border or multimarket competition requires that the firms are competitively
aware of each other, which in right circumstances manifests as the use of strategies and the
consequent effects on performance (Chen and Stucker, 1997; Ito and Rose, 2002).
Chen (1996) theorizes the antecedents to rivalry with the concepts of market commonal-
ity and resource similarity. Market commonality is defined as strategic interdependence of
firms in unique markets (Chen, 1996), which means the same as Chen and Stucker (1997)’s
cross-border competitive engagement. Resource similarity indicates that the firms are alike
in their resources, meaning that they pursue economies of scope and competitive advantages
in similar manner (Chen, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1999).
The two outcomes of multimarket competition are to reap collusive profits and to compete
more aggressively (Chen and Stucker, 1997; Ma, 1998; Ito and Rose, 2002). The differences
between the contradictory outcomes stem from their differing theoretical foundations (Ito
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and Rose, 2002). Those theories, which are based on industrial organization tend to ignore
the effect of uncertainty, and claim that multimarket contact results in collusive behaviour,
whereas those theories based on Schumpeter’s ideas of dynamics of the market place are try-
ing to model the inevitable uncertainty into the research, and claim that multimarket contact
results in more aggressive competitive moves between the players (ibid.).
Chen and Stucker (1997) and Ma (1998) both emphasize that multimarket competition inside
national market differs significantly from multimarket competition between global players.
The differences are in the availability of information (uncertainty is even greater in the global
market place), and in the organizational assumptions stemming from cultural differences of
the home countries of the players (Chen and Stucker, 1997). Also the host country markets
can be distant to all of the players involved in the competition, ever increasing the uncertainty
factor (ibid.).
According to Yu et al. (2009), there are three ways of measuring multimarket contact. Market
level measures assess the overall degree of multimarket contact among all the firms serving
in one market (Yu et al., 2009). Firm-in-market-level measures calculate the overall degree
of multimarket contact between the focal firm in one market and its competitor (ibid.). Dyad-
level measures determine the overall degree of multimarket contact between two firms in all
the markets, in which both are present (ibid.). This thesis concentrates on the two firms (a
dyad) in the global markets, so the appropriate measure is the third dyad-level measure.
Competitive strategies
The most often used definition for competitive actions in competitive dynamics research is
that competitive actions are “externally directed, specific, and observable competitive moves
initiated by a firm to enhance its relative competitive position” (Ferrier et al., 2002, p. 307;
cf. also Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001; Derfus et al., 2008). The competitive dynamics
researchers also tend to distinguish between two types of interactions: strategic and tactical
(Nair and Selover, 2012). Strategic actions are those that firms use to improve the competitive
position of their firm such as investing in new assets, and tactical actions are those that directly
respond or initiate a competitive move towards a competitor, such as pricing decisions (ibid.).
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Figure 3: Strategy terminology. The different terms used about strategic actions depend on
the point of view. Based on Chen (1996).
I suggest along with the terminology of Chen (1996) that the nuances between the different
terms can be related to the point of view of the focal firm (internal), the rival (internal), or
the researcher (external) as seen in the Figure 3 above. Focal firm initiates strategy or tactics
(internal: focal firm), which is seen as a certain behaviour or interaction from the point of
view of an outside observer (external: researcher), and experienced as actions, reactions or
moves by the competition (internal: rival) (cf. Chen, 1996). This is based on Chen (1996)’s
ideas of seeing the competition as a construct from the focal firm’s point of view.
The different strategies are most often quantified by conducting a content analysis of a news
archive related to specific industry context (e.g. Derfus et al., 2008; Upson et al., 2012; Fer-
rier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2009; Young et al., 1996). In this thesis I am trying to
pinpoint strategies and competitive actions used in the game consoles market by conducting
a content analysis of an online news archive concentrated on the gaming industry.
16
Hypercompetition
The competitive markets have evolved from the simple cases of monopolies, oligopolies and
perfect markets examined in classical economics to a more complex competition system,
which entails more uncertainty, more dynamics, and more difficulties in finding and sustain-
ing competitive advantages as before (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). D’Aveni and Gunther
(1995) call the new system a hypercompetitive market. Since the markets where strategic
interactions usually take place can be categorized as hypercompetitive, many competitive dy-
namics researchers utilize the term in their research (e.g. Baum and Korn, 1999; Gimeno and
Woo, 1999; Ferrier, 2001).
Hypercompetitive market has a few large players like a traditional oligopoly (D’Aveni and
Gunther, 1995). However, instead of relying on the market power ensured by the structure
of the industry, the companies actively pursue strategies, which erode the competitive advan-
tages of the others resulting in lower barriers to entry, and more intense competition (ibid.).
The competition can occur on local, regional, or global scale (ibid.). Especially the global
scale of production accounts for loss of information, and affects the performance of the firms
in the market (ibid.).
In the Figure 4 below the industry structure for traditional oligopoly is portrayed on the
left side. In oligopolistic or monopolistic markets the players can reap the benefits of their
market power as long as the industry structure protects their competitive advantages (Scherer,
1980). As discussed in the section 2.1, the factors supporting industry structure according
to industrial organization include barriers to entry, the number of the firms in the industry
(market concentration), the relative size of the firms in the industry (market inequality), and
the degree of differentiation of the products (Barney, 1986).
In the hypercompetitive market the traditional sources of protection in the industry are failing
because there are no sustainable competitive advantages (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). The
right side in the Figure 4 portrays the factors of industry dynamics, which lead to intensity of
rivalry (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995, cf. also competitive dynamics research, e.g. Baum and
Korn, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1999; Ferrier, 2001; Chen, 2009).
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Figure 4: Traditional vs. hypercompetitive industry structure: Hypercompetitive industry
structure consists of industry dynamic factors, which lead to increased intensity of rivalry.
Adapted from Scherer (1980); D’Aveni and Gunther (1995); Ferrier (2001); Chen and Stucker
(1997); Derfus et al. (2008).
Industry dynamics are measured by examining the length of product life cycles, assessing the
availability of the information to the players, and counting the amount of new technological
innovations in the market (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). The length of product life cycles is
shorter in the more dynamic environments, forcing companies to be innovative and quick in
their moves (ibid.). The information in the dynamic market is uncertain and asymmetric, and
there are waves of new technologies. The dynamic conditions affect firms’ abilities to make
decisions, and lead to intensified competition (ibid.).
Intensity of rivalry or competitive aggressiveness can be assessed by considering the differ-
ent dimensions of competitive attacks (Ferrier, 2001). According to Ferrier (2001), these
are volume, duration, complexity, and unpredictability. Intensity of rivalry is measured by
calculating the number of the strategic actions during a specific period, by measuring the
durations of the attacks and responses, and by counting the variety of the different strategies
used (ibid.).
Examples of hypercompetitive markets include oil, cars, tyres, mobile phones, computer
chips, computers, and fizzy beverages (e.g. D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995; Rose and Ito, 2008,
2009; Nair and Selover, 2012; Upson et al., 2012). Service-based industries dominated by
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a few players, but engaged in competitive battle include consulting, banking and finance,
newspapers, and airline services (e.g. D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995; Gimeno and Woo, 1999;
Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). The game consoles market examined in this thesis also
satisfies the characteristics of hypercompetitive market in the global scale.
Creative destruction
Competitive strategy researchers often refer to Joseph A. Schumpeter’s idea of creative de-
struction from the 1930s (e.g. Barney, 1986; Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Ferrier, 2001).
Creative destruction occurs when firms that once held the state-of-the-art innovation in a mar-
ket are overrun by the next generation of innovation, building on or imitating the first-movers
(Collis and Montgomery, 1995).
Nonaka and Johansson (1996) assess the advantages of the intense rivalry (in Sandberg,
2001). In hypercompetitive markets consumers are kept educated about the product, the
core features of the product are defined, consumer preferences are updated, price is kept low
and quality high, suppliers are kept educated and the technology is diffused, training and
after-sales service are continuously improved and new and complementary components can
be produced (ibid.).
2.2.2 Theories
In this section I am looking into theories of multimarket competition. The theories discussed
in this thesis are oligopolistic reaction (bandwagon effect, follow-the-leader behaviour), first
mover and late mover strategies, exchange of threats (multimarket retaliation) and mutual
forbearance (rivalry deterrence). The specific theories have been chosen to reflect the most
discussed topics in the reviewed literature on multimarket rivalry. At the end I review the
ideas of the school of competitive dynamics, including the concept of the Red Queen ef-
fect.
Oligopolistic reaction is a pattern of investment behaviour between firms investing in multiple
markets (Rose and Ito, 2008). It is related to first mover and late mover strategies of the
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firms, where both being the pioneer and being the follower can have implications for financial
performance of the firms (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998).
Exchange of threats is behaviour found between multimarket competitors, where the com-
peting firms place so called foothold attacks in each other’s key markets in order to threaten
the other player (Upson et al., 2012). The theory of mutual forbearance suggests that firms
may also implicitly collude and refrain from competition when they meet in multiple markets
(Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000).
At the end of this section, I look into the advances of the competitive dynamics stream in
more detail (e.g. Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; Derfus et al., 2008; Nair and
Selover, 2012). The discussed literature is summarized in an analytical table (Table 1) at the
end of this section.
Oligopolistic reaction
Knickerbocker (1973) was one of the first to discuss the geographical patterns of foreign
direct investment, and used the term bandwagon effect to describe the clustering of the in-
vestments in the same industries and locations (in John et al., 1997; Rose and Ito, 2008).
The effect, which is also known as the follow-the-leader behaviour is based on the idea that
companies in an oligopolistic setting need to react to their competition in order to survive,
and therefore tend to follow each other into new markets (Rose and Ito, 2008).
This behaviour, also coined oligopolistic reaction or herding results in multimarket contact
(Ito and Rose, 2002; Rose and Ito, 2009). The first moving leader is called as the pioneer
(Rose and Ito, 2009). In the case of multiple firms in an oligopolistic market like in the tyre
industry, Ito and Rose (2002) and Rose and Ito (2009) find evidence that the order of the
investing companies rarely differs from market to market. These specific rivalries tend to
follow each other’s movements, but ignore or avoid the rest of the firm in the market (Rose
and Ito, 2008).
It has been argued that the reason why firms tend to establish themselves in the same markets
as the first movers is to reduce uncertainty by becoming more familiar with the competition
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(Ito and Rose, 2002). Due to this mutual familiarity, Ito and Rose (2002) suggest that firms
are more likely to invest in those areas where their competition is already present.
Rose and Ito (2008) examine Japanese car manufacturers’ international strategies, and find
evidence of reduced oligopolistic reaction and specific rivalry between certain players. Al-
though the theory of oligopolistic reaction was first used to examine the actions of the firms
from the same home country, Ito and Rose (2002) and Rose and Ito (2009) show that also the
global tyre industry displays evidence of the herding behaviour. The study is further reviewed
in the empirical examples section 2.2.3.
First mover and late mover strategies
First mover advantage is a term coined for the performance effects of the timing of entry into
a market (Street et al., 2010). It states that the firm, which takes the leadership position, tends
to perform better financially than its late moving counterpart (Lieberman and Montgomery,
1988, 1998; Ito and Rose, 2002; Street et al., 2010). First move can be related to entering
the market before the competition by acquiring scarce assets, entering with a new product
and positioning and branding itself in the minds of the consumers before the competition, or
entering with a new kind of work process or business model (Ito and Rose, 2002; Street et al.,
2010).
However, there are also multiple studies, which have found no evidence of the first mover
advantages, and even those that have found that instead late movers are those reaping the
benefits (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) ex-
plain that pioneers can often miss market opportunities, as they can initially acquire wrong
resources because of the uncertainty in the market place.
Sandberg (2001) recommends that the late movers should carefully observe the first mover’s
products, find the core features of the products that the consumers prefer, and produce goods
and services tailored to succeed by stepping up the market or changing the game by introduc-
ing something better, simpler, or differently positioned than the first mover. Conversely Rose
and Ito (2009) posit that late mover firms tend not to have the skills to be pioneers, because
they are not as experienced as the first moving companies. It is therefore possible that the late
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movers have difficulties in stepping up the market like Sandberg (2001) suggests (cf. Rose
and Ito, 2009).
Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) note in their literature review that the conflicting out-
comes for different first and late mover studies may be the result of conceptual differences.
In order to clarify the concept of first mover advantages, Lieberman and Montgomery (1998)
suggest combining empirical studies on the first mover advantages with the theories in re-
source based view (RBV).
Street et al. (2010) present a theoretical framework based on RBV, where first mover ad-
vantages are dependent on specific firm resources. According to the authors, because of the
riskiness of the first moves, firms should first analyse their resources and capabilities, and as-
sess the environmental dynamics carefully before launching ahead their competition (Street
et al., 2010).
Exchange of threats
Graham (1975; 1985) first explained behaviour called exchange of threats, where the rival
oligopolistic firms engage in foreign investment in another’s home market in order to send
a threatening message to the rival, so that they would leave the competitor’s home market
(in John et al., 1997). Similarly Watson (1982) recommends that global corporations should
engage in counter-competitive moves that prevent foreign companies from functioning in
their domestic market by penetrating their home markets.
The countermoves can be either product-related or non-product competitive moves relating
to the manufacturing techniques or after-sales support (Watson, 1982). However, the tactics
only work in such markets where it is possible to capture market share quickly, to offer a
differentiated and inimitable product, and to build a distinguishable infrastructure (ibid.).
This idea is further defined as cross-subsidization by Hamel and Prahalad (1985).
Hamel and Prahalad (1985) explain cross-subsidization as a way to direct the firm’s resources
to a subsidiary in a strategic position, that is, in a weak market (loose brick) for the com-
petitor in order to catch the market share where the competitor is too weak to react. The
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authors describe a situation where an aggressive competitor attacks a foreign competitor in
the home (=main) market for the foreign competitor, and the foreign competitor retaliates by
attacking in foreign markets where the aggressive competitor is weak (Hamel and Prahalad,
1985).
Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) formulate multiple point competition theory called mutual
foothold equilibrium, which postulates that firms meeting each other repeatedly in multiple
markets should choose to obtain small footholds in each other’s key markets rather than
engaging in a total war or holding a total peace. This idea extends the ideas of exchange of
threats to anticipating the retaliatory moves of the competition, instead skipping the costly
war and resulting in a mutually balanced behaviour (ibid.).
Edwards (1955) formulated the idea of spheres of influence, which are defined as asymmetric
market positions of the firms in their overlapping markets (in Bernheim and Whinston, 1990;
Jayanchandran et al., 1999). In a similar manner to Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985)’s foothold
positions, the spheres of influence lead to mutual understanding between the competing firms
(Jayanchandran et al., 1999).
Upson et al. (2012) is a recent discussion and theorization of footholds as a strategic tool. The
authors posit that footholds are a signal to the competition that the player is ready to make
a move (Upson et al., 2012). However, the move can either be aggressive or withdrawing,
and therefore footholds function as competitive deterrents that increase the uncertainty in the
market place (ibid.).
Utilizing Chen (1996)’s concepts market commonality and resource similarity, Upson et al.
(2012) predict that the similarity of resources and markets between the competing firms affect
the competitor’s willingness to place a foothold attack (Upson et al., 2012). If the resources
and markets contested are not similar, competitor is more likely to place a foothold attack
because it does not fear retaliation as much (Upson et al., 2012). Similarly, if the firms have
a lot of common ground resource- and market-wise, the competitor is likely to maintain its
foothold positions for the deterrence reasons than if the resources and markets are not as
overlapping (ibid).
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Mutual forbearance
Edwards (1955) was one of the first industrial organization researchers to formulate the idea 
of mutual forbearance, which postulates that when firms meet regularly in multiple markets, 
the level of competition between them de-escalates (in Yu et al., 2009; Ma, 1998; Baum 
and Korn, 1999; Jayanchandran et al., 1999). This happens because the firms have reached 
foothold equilibrium, where each firm holds a threat of retaliation over the other’s key market 
(cf. Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985).
Although the original theory by Edwards (1955) concerned diversified conglomerate compa-
nies, Gimeno and Woo (1999) add that mutual forbearance is on the contrary most likely to
happen when the firms have similar resources (cf. Chen, 1996, resource similarity) and both
aim for same economies of scope with their market expansion strategies (cf. Chen, 1996,
market commonality). Similarly, Jayanchandran et al. (1999) explain that mutual forbear-
ance depends on the level of familiarity, and the deterrence abilities of the firm. Familiarity
refers to firms’ awareness of the other players’ actions, whereas deterrence means the retal-
iatory powers perceived by the competitor (ibid.).
Ma (1998) criticizes the studies for not considering the antecedents for mutual forbearance
theory, and assuming that firms automatically engage in de-escalation of competition if they
meet in multiple markets. Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) agree, and assess that mutual
forbearance is likely to occur only when conditions of centralized decision-making and non-
complex environments are assumed.
Yu et al. (2009) examine mutual forbearance hypothesis in a global multimarket setting,
where they find evidence for local responsiveness factors affecting the rivalry of global com-
petitors. On the basis of their findings, Yu et al. (2009) explain that firms with tightly con-
trolled subsidiaries are able to reap the benefits of the mutual forbearance, whereas those
firms with independent subsidiaries are less efficient in controlling rivalry (cf. Haveman and
Nonnemaker, 2000). This is also supported by Rose and Ito (2008)’s finding of mutual avoid-
ance between the highly concentrated Japanese car manufacturers.
Derfus et al. (2008) suggest that high industry demand is one of the antecedents to mutual
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forbearance. If the goods produced by the industry are in high demand, the overall mar-
ket share pie increases and consumers want the product or service (Derfus et al., 2008). A
growing market results in so called “live and let live”-attitude among the players, where com-
petitive actions are avoided and all the players can grow without costly competitive moves
(ibid.). On the other hand, declining demand means increasing competition and even a full on
war if some firms are not willing to quit the industry without a fight (D’Aveni and Gunther,
1995).
Ma (1998) proposes that the willingness of the firms to mutually collude depends on multiple
antecedents. The author suggests that relative market positions, corporate strategy (global
or multidomestic), product diversification strategy, organizational structure (globalization vs.
localization), subsidiary control, resource and capability profiles, organizational culture, and
trade policies in the market environment (antitrust organizations) are all factors in the firms’
decisions to mutually forbear from competing (ibid.).
Both Jayanchandran et al. (1999) and Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) theorize that if the
firms are familiar with each other through meeting often in multiple markets, they may actu-
ally compete more aggressively because of the reduced uncertainty. Based on these theories,
the authors suggest an inverted U-shape between the firm’s willingness to compete aggres-
sively and multimarket contact (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). Baum and Korn (1999)
find evidence of the inversely U-shaped relationship between the entry and exit levels and
multimarket contact in a California airlines market.
The U-shaped mutual forbearance is depicted in the Figure 5. First when firms have a little
multimarket contact, there is rivalry, since there are no strategic footholds to use as a threat-
ening strategy (cf. Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). As the amounts of multimarket contact
and footholds increase, mutual forbearance starts to affect the behaviour, since the firms want
to avoid retaliatory actions (ibid.). Eventually, when the level of multimarket contact in-
creases even further, the firms have become so familiar with each other that they appear more
daring in their strategies (ibid.).
Baum and Korn (1999) call for examination of the effects of intentionally built multimarket
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Figure 5: Multimarket contact and mutual forbearance. Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000)
suggest that the relationship between multimarket contact and mutual forbearance is inversely
U-shaped.
contact pursuing mutual forbearance, and Gimeno (2002) answers by trying to find out if
mutual forbearance performance effect is stronger if the motivation behind establishing mul-
timarket contact with competitors is intended versus if it happens off chance. The author
finds that in his data of US airlines the performance improvements due to mutual forbearance
occur when the level of multimarket contact is high, and that it does not matter whether the
contact was formed with strategic intent or by off chance (Gimeno, 2002).
Competitive dynamics
Rooted on Schumpeter’s ideas of dynamics of competition (Barney, 1986), research has been
done to specifically account for dynamic interactions between firms (cf. Chen, 2009, for a
comprehensive narratorial of the development of the competitive dynamics research stream
in the University of Maryland). As discussed in the section 2.1, competitive dynamics is a
recent research program trying to combine the results from the previous research of strategy
and competitive firm behaviour (Chen, 2009).
The research concentrates on individual competitive actions between pairs of rival firms (firm
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dyads) (Chen, 1996; Baum and Korn, 1999; Chen, 2009). The researchers emphasize the
uniqueness of each competitive relationship (Chen, 1996). As an example, Chen (1996) dis-
cusses the concept of competitive asymmetry. It states that even if B is A’s major competitor,
it is not necessarily that A is B’s major competitor (ibid.). This emphasizes the way how each
firm is seen as individual, and each relationship examined through the relative positions of
the firms (ibid.).
The findings from the competitive dynamics stream suggest that the number of the competi-
tive actions (volume; inertia), the repertoire of the actions (complexity and unpredictability;
simplicity and nonconformity), and the timing of the actions (duration) are all related to
firm performance (Ferrier, 2001; Chen, 2009). Ferrier (2001) posits that a greater number
of more complex actions lead to better financial performance. The studies have also found
that the faster the timing of the counteractions, the better the performance of the focal firm
(ibid.).
The theoretical foundation behind the competitive dynamics research is called the awareness-
motivation-capability framework (Chen, 1996; Chen and Stucker, 1997; Yu and Cannella,
2007). The framework states that a firm must be aware of the actions of the competition,
there needs to be a reward that motivates the firm to act against the action, and finally, the
firm must have the right resources to be able to respond to the attack (Chen, 1996; Chen and
Stucker, 1997; Yu and Cannella, 2007). The roots of the awareness-motivation-capability
framework are in resource-based-view of the firm discussed earlier in the section 2.1 of this
literature review.
Chen and Stucker (1997) propose conceptually that such characteristics as the level of firms
strategy (multidomestic or global), the international experience of the top management team,
the level of control in the subsidiaries, the level of knowledge transfer between the sub-
sidiaries and the headquarters, the cultural distance between the subsidiaries and the head-
quarters, the barriers in the local markets, the diversity of the local markets and the cultural
distance between the competitors, all affect the awareness-motivation-capability framework
of the competing firms.
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Nair and Selover (2012) is a recent example of a study in competitive dynamics stream.
The authors study Pepsi and Coca-Cola in order to test for hypotheses relating to dynamic
competition theories (ibid.). They examine how the competing firms react to each other, and
whether there is evidence of oligopolistic reaction, exchange of threats, or mutual forbearance
(ibid.). The study is further reviewed under the next section as an empirical example.
Ferrier et al. (2002) suggest that firms that compete aggressively and engage in rivalry appear
to be winning market share and fare better financially than those firms that are not able to en-
gage in aggressive competition. They define competitive aggressiveness as those competitive
actions that challenge the competition and try to steal the market share in a hypercompetitive
environment, where speed and timing of the actions is crucial for survival (ibid.).
The survival and success of the most aggressive player is echoed in the concept of the Red
Queen effect. Derfus et al. (2008) define the Red Queen effect as constant striving to be better
than the competition. The idea of the Red Queen effect has been derived from a discussion
between the Red Queen and Alice in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass2.
The Red Queen effect further describes Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction, where
firms that stand still are left behind when those firms that are constantly searching for the
next innovation win market share (Derfus et al., 2008; Baumol, 2004). In a Schumpeterian
manner (Baumol, 2004) emphasizes the Red Queen nature of innovation, where especially in
high-technology industries no firm can leave outside the constant upgrading of their products
in fear of becoming obsolete and outdated, and therefore to be run over and destroyed by
their competition.
Table 1 summarizes the discussed theories, their short definitions, and the related authors.
2“Alice realizes that although she is running as fast as she can, she is not getting anywhere, relative to her
surroundings. The Red Queen responds: ‘Here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!’ (Carroll, 1960: 345)” (in
Derfus et al., 2008).
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Theory Authors Definition
Oligopolistic Knickerbocker (1973) Clustering of investments;
reaction Ito and Rose (2002) herding behaviour of the firms
Rose and Ito (2008) in multiple markets.
Rose and Ito (2009)
First movers Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) First-mover and late-mover
and late movers Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) theories explain which strategy
Sandberg (2001) is better for multiple point
Street et al. (2010) competition players: being the
pioneer or being the follower.
Exchange Graham (1975; 1985) Strategic behaviour by competi-
of threats Watson (1982) tive firms in multiple markets,
Hamel and Prahalad (1985) where firms acquire strategic
Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) resources, which they can use
Upson et al. (2012) as footholds over the other firm.
Mutual Edwards (1955) Collusive or cooperative implicit
forbearance Ma (1998) or explicit strategy of avoidance
Baum and Korn (1999) between firms in multiple mar-
Jayanchandran et al. (1999) kets. There is an inverse U-
Gimeno and Woo (1999) shaped relationship between
Gimeno (2002) multimarket contact and
Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) mutual forbearance.
Yu et al. (2009)
Competitive Chen (1996) Firm action dynamics in
dynamics Chen and Stucker (1997) Schumpeter’s footsteps set
Ferrier (2001) in awareness-motivation-capa-
Ferrier et al. (2002) bility framework. Aims to ex-
Yu and Cannella (2007) plain why and how firms com-
Chen (2009) pete in multiple markets.
Nair and Selover (2012)
Baumol (2004)
Derfus et al. (2008)
Table 1: Theories of multimarket competition
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2.2.3 Empirical examples
In this empirical examples section I am introducing some of the most recent and relevant em-
pirical research on the concepts and theories examined in the previous parts. I am discussing
the contents of each study, mentioning the method of the data analysis and shortly reviewing
the main findings and limitations.
The studies examined here are examples of differently chosen data in the recent empirical
works (national – global, industry specific – multiple industries). These specific examples
were also chosen as they reflect similar methods than the ones used in the empirical case
for this thesis. In most studies the data was generated by structured content analysis, and
analysed through an econometric analysis of panel data. Table 2 summarizes the reviewed
empirical examples.
Ito and Rose (2002) and Rose and Ito (2009)
Ito and Rose (2002) and Rose and Ito (2009) examine the behaviour of the firms in the global
tyre industry. The research objective of the first study is to examine the player behaviour
in subsidiary location decisions in the context of the theories of oligopolistic reaction and
first mover advantages (Ito and Rose, 2002). The second study considers pairs of firms, and
concentrates on the concept of specific rivalry (Rose and Ito, 2009).
The tyre industry can be thought as a global oligopoly, since there were five multinational
players in 1992 with a global market concentration of 75 per cent (Ito and Rose, 2002). Ito
and Rose (2002) also compare the 1992 results with the observations from 1982 with ten tyre
manufacturers, and 1987 with eight tyre manufacturers. Rose and Ito (2009) utilize the same
data. The data analysis is conducted through a binomial logistic regression analysis in both
studies (Ito and Rose, 2002; Rose and Ito, 2009).
The main findings in the 2002 study are that investment patterns are related to the number
and identities of competitors, host country characteristics, and foreign experience (Ito and
Rose, 2002). The authors find evidence of oligopolistic reaction in the global tyre manufac-
turing oligopoly (ibid.). In the 2009 study the authors find that the strategic behaviours of
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the firms differ depending on both the presence of individual rival firms (especially the pio-
neer), and the amount of the past interactions between firms (Rose and Ito, 2009). Since the
studies are limited to only one industry with specific characteristics, it is difficult to draw any
generalizable conclusions.
Yu and Cannella (2007) and Yu et al. (2009)
Yu and Cannella (2007) and Yu et al. (2009) consider the global car manufacturing indus-
try in their studies. Yu and Cannella (2007) are interested in the strategizing opportunities
of the firms in the case of international markets, where the effect of such factors than sub-
sidiary ownership, local regulations, local competition, and cultural distance may affect the
behaviour of the firms. Yu et al. (2009) consider the same data concentrating on the effects
of the international business factors to the mutual forbearance hypothesis.
The studies consider data from 13 firms in the car manufacturing industry between the years
1995 and 2001 (Yu and Cannella, 2007; Yu et al., 2009). The examined firms cover 76–88 %
of the total production, so car manufacturing can be thought as a global oligopoly (ibid.). The
both studies use the same structured content analysis with 65 keywords on an industry publi-
cation with 6,648 articles, which included 1,778 subsidiary actions in 27 countries (ibid.). Yu
and Cannella (2007) use the event history approach in the data analysis, and Yu et al. (2009)
use the generalized least squares method.
Yu and Cannella (2007) find that distance between the countries slows the strategic actions
speed, government policy can also affect the speed of strategies used negatively, and market-
related actions such as the strategic importance of the attacked market and the amount of
multimarket contact between the firms result in speedier actions. Yu et al. (2009) discover
that greater subsidiary ownership strengthens the deterrence influence of multimarket contact
on competitive aggressiveness, whereas cultural distance, local regulatory restrictions, and
the presence of local competitors decrease it.
Similarly than Ito and Rose (2002) and Rose and Ito (2009) above, Yu and Cannella (2007)
and Yu et al. (2009) are also limited to one industry, so the obtained results cannot be gen-
eralized further. Yu et al. (2009) are, however, quite confident that similar results could be
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obtained also in any other domestic or global setting, where difficulties with subsidiary con-
trol are manifesting. Yu et al. (2009) criticize the structured data analysis method for its
shortcomings: the method is highly dependent on the data chosen by the analysed publica-
tion, and there may be omissions in the data.
Ferrier et al. (2002)
Ferrier et al. (2002) is a multi-industry study on Fortune 500 firms. The research problem of
the study is to find whether those firms that are experiencing financial distress compete more
aggressively than those, which are doing well in the market (ibid.). The authors also study the
organizational and environmental antecedents to competitive aggressiveness (ibid.).
Since there have been conflicting results on what sort of firms tend to compete aggressively,
Ferrier et al. (2002) try to find a contingency theory and pinpoint the factors that lead to ag-
gressive competitive behaviour. Some theories claim that losing firms are risk takers, whereas
winning firms are risk aversive (ibid.). The other theories posit the opposite, where losing
firms rely on their old behaviour and try to avoid taking deviating risks, whereas winning
firms take proactive stance in order to maintain their market-leading positions (ibid.).
The data consists of Fortune 500 firms which were ranked first or second in their industries in
terms of the U.S. market share between 1987 and 93 (Ferrier et al., 2002). The final data set
consisted of total 4,617 product-market actions in 39 different industries collected through
a structured content analysis (ibid.). The authors use the SAS regression technique PROC
MIXED regression in their regression analysis (ibid.).
Ferrier et al. (2002) explain that those firms which do not have heterogeneous management
teams are losing when the management is backward-looking and risk-averse, and winning
when the management proactively engages in competition. The authors also find that those
firms that function in industries with high entry barriers and high concentration ratios are
more likely to compete aggressively in financial distress, which explains the differences in
previous studies (ibid.).
The study is very general, and the authors suggest finer grained research as they posit that the
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specific industry characteristics play such a big role in determining which way the companies
tend to behave (Ferrier et al., 2002). The study also only considers large, mainly US-based
firms, and the authors suggest that examining smaller firms could be beneficial (ibid.).
Derfus et al. (2008)
The domestic-set multi-industry study by Derfus et al. (2008) examines the Red Queen ef-
fect by asking whether the effect exist, and considering possible moderating factors such as
concentration, industry demand and market position (whether the firm is a leader or a fol-
lower).
The data consists of 11 industries in the United States, and it was collected with the structured
content analysis resulting in 56 firms between 1993 and 1998 (Derfus et al., 2008). The final
data set includes 4,474 actions (ibid.). The authors used random-effects regression model and
negative binomial regressions to analyse their data (ibid.)
Derfus et al. (2008) find that the speed and duration of competitive attacks seems to be in-
creasing in the US market, which supports the Red Queen effect theory. The authors also find
evidence of the moderating factors affecting the speed of the actions (Derfus et al., 2008).
The market position is an exception to their expectations, where they find that the leaders are
more negatively influenced by rival actions than the followers, which supports the late mover
theories (ibid.).
The study is only limited to the US environment and considers only big firms, and is there-
fore too generalized to draw any conclusions to any specific industry contexts (Derfus et al.,
2008).
Nair and Selover (2012)
Nair and Selover (2012) is a recent study on competitive dynamics, examining the battle
between Coca-Cola and Pepsi in order to find out how firms are interacting, if is there evi-
dence of the mutual forbearance, and who is following whom (first mover, late mover strate-
gies).
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Study Data Methods used; Strategies
dependent variable considered
Ito and Rose (2002) Tyre industry Logistic binary model; Oligopolistic reaction
Rose and Ito (2009) Global Subsidiary location First/Late movers
FDI
Yu and Cannella (2007) Car industry Structured content Multimarket contact
Yu et al. (2009) Global analysis Competitive
Event history approach aggressiveness
Regression analysis; Subsidiary level
Competitive actions
Ferrier et al. (2002) Multiple Structured content Competitive
industries analysis aggressiveness
Global Regression analysis; Speed
Competitive actions Performance
Derfus et al. (2008) Multiple Structured content Red Queen effect
industries analysis Competitive
Domestic Regression analysis; aggressiveness
Competitive actions Speed
Performance
Nair and Selover (2012) Coke vs. Pepsi Pricing model; Competitive
Domestic Product prices aggressiveness
Mutual forbearance
First/Late movers
Table 2: Empirical studies on multimarket competition
The authors use the weekly pricing information of 12-packs between 2000 and 2005 in two
US markets as the data (Nair and Selover, 2012). The econometric analysis used includes
cointegration analysis, the Goldfeld–Quandt test, and the Granger causality test (ibid.).
The authors find that Coke’s and Pepsi’s strategies clearly display interdependent relation-
ships, but there is neither evidence of mutual forbearance, nor a clear division to a pioneer
and a follower (Nair and Selover, 2012). Since the data is limited only to two markets, which
both are domestic, the data limitations may affect the results, and cannot be generalized even
to the level of the companies (ibid.).
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2.3 Summary of the literature review and theoretical framework
Figure 6 summarizes the basic assumptions in the literature considering the relationships be-
tween multimarket contact, strategic actions, and performance between two firms competing
in multiple markets. Figure 6 forms the theoretical framework and the theoretical contribution
of this study.
Chen (1996) answers to the call to examine rivalry and strategy as a relative construct between
a pair of firms. In this thesis I too take this relative position and examine a pair of firms’
relative rivalry rather than the whole market setting. The theoretical framework starts with a
pair of firms, and considers their internal resources and external market factors as a basis for
their resource similarity and market commonality (Chen, 1996).
The internal factors are those internal resources and capabilities of the firms such as size,
economies of scale, market position, top management team heterogeneity, corporate strat-
egy, the level of subsidiary control and cultural considerations (e.g. Chen and Stucker, 1997;
Upson et al., 2012). The external factors are those related to the external market such as
concentration, industry demand and growth, the length of product life cycles, availability of
information and the amount of uncertainty, and the pace of the technological innovation (e.g.
Derfus et al., 2008; D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995).
If resource similarity and market commonality are high enough, firms are engaged in mul-
timarket competition through the awareness-motivation-capability framework of competitive
dynamics (e.g. Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Yu and Cannella, 2007). Multimarket competi-
tion manifests as attacks and counterattacks (e.g. Ferrier, 2001). In global business, it may
also be seen in the clustering investment patterns of the firms as oligopolistic reaction, and
first mover and late mover strategies of the firms (e.g. Rose and Ito, 2009; Lieberman and
Montgomery, 1998).
Exchange of threats is strategic behaviour by competitive firms, where firms acquire strategic
resources, which they can use as leverage over the other firm (Hamel and Prahalad, 1985).
The theory of mutual forbearance describes collusive or cooperative implicit or explicit strat-
egy between firms (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). There are both evidence that support
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Figure 6: Theoretical framework presents the relationships between antecedents and the dif-
ferent outcomes of multimarket competition between a pair of competing multinationals.
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous sections (e.g. Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985;
Rose and Ito, 2009; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Hamel and Prahalad, 1985; Haveman
and Nonnemaker, 2000; Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Derfus et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2009)
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mutual forbearance, and evidence against it, which has made some researchers to conclude
that there exists an inverse relationship between mutual forbearance and the amount of mul-
timarket contact (e.g. Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Baum and Korn, 1999).
The most probable result is that the firms neither engage in total war nor they collude by
having total peace, rather they end up placing small foothold in each other’s markets in order
to be able to respond in case the other firm manoeuvres something new in the key markets
(cf. Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Upson et al., 2012).
Multimarket competition can have effects on financial performance, and in the case of un-
certain market settings and short product lifecycles it can also result in hypercompetition (cf.
D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). Hypercompetitive markets drive the technological progress for-
ward, and affect the whole world’s economics through the creative destruction and the Red
Queen effect (cf. Baumol, 2004).
In the section 1.3 of this thesis I formulated the research problem as
How does the competition between Microsoft and Sony compare to the previous
research on other types of businesses and market settings, and how could the data
be presented so that the reliability of the statistical inferences would be improved.
In this chapter I have introduced the previous research on other types of businesses and market
settings, and reviewed the methods of data analysis for several empirical examples. By con-
ducting this literature review I have achieved the objective set for the chapter two to review
the literature on multimarket competition and to present a synthesized theoretical framework
of competitive interactions for global firms. I utilize the framework in the chapter six, when
I discuss the results of the game consoles case. Next I move on to the case study.
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3 MICROSOFT VERSUS SONY
Entertainment is more amazing with Xbox.3
Never stop playing.4
In this chapter I discuss the game consoles case in detail. I first further justify why I am
including only Microsoft’s Xbox 360 (Xbox) and Sony’s PlayStation 3 (PS3) in the discus-
sion. I then include relevant information on the players and their game consoles divisions (cf.
Table 3 for a summary of the section 3.2). The chapter is concluded by setting hypotheses
for the empirical testing.
3.1 Case limitations
The hypercompetitive gaming market is not limited only to game consoles. In addition to the
three game consoles produced by Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo, the gaming market includes
other gaming platforms, which are often seen as substitutes to game consoles, as most of
the players prefer to concentrate on a single platform (e.g. console gamers vs. PC gamers).
Consequently, it would be also possible to look into the gaming market as a whole, as it is
quite artificial to try to separate the players in the concentrated gaming market. For example,
Microsoft produces games and the Windows platform for PC gamers, while Sony competes
with Nintendo in handheld consoles.
Other gaming devices besides game consoles include mobile multifunction phones and tablets
(Apple iPhone and iPad, Android phones and tablets), handheld consoles (Nintendo 3DS,
Sony PS Vita) and personal computers (PCs), including social games, and multiplayer war
and role playing games played online such as the World of Warcraft (in order to review the
current supply, see for example Electronic Arts, 2013a,b; Nintendo, 2013b; Sony PlayStation,
2013e; Blizzard Entertainment, 2013).
Furthermore, the game consoles oligopoly is undergoing changes due to recent advances
3Current US Xbox 360 slogan (Microsoft Xbox, 2013e).
4Current US PlayStation 3 slogan (Sony PlayStation, 2013b).
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in technology. Despite the game console market’s consolidation, which has shrunken the
console manufacturing to the oligopoly of three companies for the duration of the last seven
years, there are firms willing to take on the challenge of trying to penetrate the barriers to
entry to the game consoles market (cf. Fitzsimmons, 2012).
Ouya is a recent game console venture developed by Boxer8 and planned to launch in April
2013 (Fitzsimmons, 2012). Another new venture into the game console market is Google’s
cloud service OnLive platform, which lets the players to access the gaming data for console
games online, and play the games without a physical console with just a controller, a TV, and
an Internet access (Robinson, 2011).
In the beginning of the thesis I explained the limitation of the empirical examination to in-
clude data considering only Sony’s PS3 and Microsoft’s Xbox. There I described the differ-
ences in product markets between the two case console manufacturers, and Nintendo, which
produces the Wii console. Although Nintendo is usually also included in the discussion on the
oligopolistic market for game consoles manufacturing, based on the differences in their con-
sumer segments and the fact that Nintendo is already moving on to the eight generation with
its eight generation console Wii U, I am omitting the data considering Nintendo’s Wii.
I am including the data from 2007 to 2012, comprising the seventh generation of the game
consoles market. Although both consoles were in retail already in 2006, 2006 is not included
in the discussion due to data availability reasons. I do not limit the data geographically.
However, it should be noted that the home (and key) markets of the firms are the United
States for Microsoft and Japan for Sony.
The industry analyst VGChartz (2013b) estimates that United States, United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France and Japan form 70 % of the global retail games market. Subsequently, although
the market is global, most of the sales are still generated in the developed countries. However,
the developing BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) markets are growing, and present an
important market opportunity for both firms now and in the future (cf. O’Neill, 2001; Wilson
et al., 2011).
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Figure 7: Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 models (Microsoft Xbox, 2013c; Sony PlayStation,
2013f).
3.2 The players
The seventh generation game consoles
Microsoft’s entertainment division, Interactive Entertainment Business division (in 2011
Annual report Xbox belongs to Entertainment and Devices Division) is responsible for the
production of Microsoft’s second version of the game console Xbox 360 (Microsoft, 2011a,b,
cf. Figure 7 on the left). The division also includes the production of the online service Xbox
LIVE, and the motion technology device Kinect for the Xbox 360 (Microsoft, 2011a). Xbox
has sold approximately 68.1 million units in its lifetime (by Q2/2012), which begun a year
before the launch of PS3 in October 2005 (VGChartz, 2013a). Although widely rumoured to
be in development and ready for launch by the end of 2013, Microsoft is yet to announce a
new generation Xbox (Rivington, 2013).
Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI) is a business division of the Japanese multina-
tional Sony Corporation (SCEI, 2013a). It is responsible for developing, producing, market-
ing, and selling the PlayStation 3 (ibid.; cf. Figure 7 on the right). By Q2/2012, PS3 has
sold approximately 66.2 million units worldwide (VGChartz, 2013a). PS3 is Sony’s third
iteration of a game console, making Sony the longest standing player in the game console
market (Rivington, 2008). The original PlayStation was released in 1994 followed by the
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Feature Microsoft Xbox Sony PS3
Best price in 2012 Cheapest model at $199 Most expensive model at $299
Console launch First in 11/2005 Second in 11/2006
Exclusive best- Gears of War, Fable, Little Big Planet, Killzone,
selling franchises Halo etc. SingStar etc.
Media content Xbox LIVE PSN; Quicker to adopt the media
entertainment concept
Online service Xbox LIVE community (larger) PSN community
Paid subscriptions Xbox Gold PSN Plus service includes
better games and other content
Motion controlling Kinect launched second PlayStation Move launched first
device in 11/2010 in 09/2010
Market leader US market in 2012 Japanese market in 2012
Global sales in 2012
Bundles based on e.g. Gears of War 3, Star Wars e.g. Uncharted 3, God of War
exclusive titles
Technological Integrating Windows 8 and 3D compatibility;
leadership Windows Phone as part of the Doubles as a Blue-ray player;
console experience as well: Best model has bigger storage
SmartGlass
Other advantage Collaboration with Nike+, Slim and sleek model design is
Kinect training: opportunities attractive to gamers
also for non-traditional gamers
Table 3: Xbox vs. PS3. Table summarizes the discussion of the firms’ products and services.
See Goss (2010); Chacksfield (2010); Smith (2011a,b); Totilo (2012); VGChartz (2013a);
Evans (2013); Microsoft Xbox (2013c); Sony PlayStation (2013f); cf. also Table 4.
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Specification Xbox PS3
Hard drive 250 GB 500 GB
Ports 5 2.0 USB ports; 1 Kinect port 2 USB 2.0 ports
Weight 2.9 kg 2.1 kg
Dimensions 270 mm x 75 mm x 264 mm 290 mm x 60 mm x 230 mm
Optical drive CD, DVD CD, DVD, BD
Table 4: Technical comparison. Table summarizes some key technical specifications for the
current Xbox and PS3 models. See Microsoft Xbox (2013b); Sony PlayStation (2013a).
PS2 in 2000, and the PS3 in 2006 (ibid.). Sony has also announced in 2013 that there will be
a PS4, although the exact launch time is yet unknown (Fitzimmons, 2013).
Although Microsoft was able to launch their new generation console well ahead of the com-
petition, the early mover strategy backfired to some extent when the reports of the infamous
red ring of death problem started to come in (Hartley, 2008a). Some reports estimated that
almost 25 % of the Microsoft consoles malfunctioned during the first two years after the
purchase (Lytle, 2009). Although the problem, caused by overheating was fixed in the subse-
quent models, the reputation of the console suffered.
When the smaller, Blu-ray and high-definition boasting PS3 finally launched in the end of
2006, Xbox was only saved because Microsoft was able to offer the Xbox models for almost
$200 cheaper than Sony, which was struggling with high production costs of making PS3
(cf. Table 5; Goldstein, 2006). As the seventh generation console production has developed
further, the quality and price differences between the hardware of the two consoles have been
minimized almost completely, and it is hard to say which one of the two would be better in
terms of hardware, as it can be seen in the Table 4.
Game availability is another important feature in the game consoles market. In the beginning
of the battle, there were better games offered for Xbox, while Sony was finding it hard to
provide quality games to sell with the powerful console (Rivington, 2007d). While Sony’s
own studios were struggling to offer any good exclusive titles, the third party game developers
were initially not very keen on providing games for the new PlayStation either (Rivington,
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2007c).
Over time, the game availability has increased for both consoles, and currently game avail-
ability is rarely a decisive feature for the buyer. While most of the third party titles are
offered for both consoles, Microsoft appears to be holding more tightly on to the exclusive
game strategy with their exclusive game series Fable, Gears of War and, Halo (Chacksfield,
2010).
Concurrently with the launches of the two consoles, there was a media format war between
Toshiba’s HD DVD and Sony’s Blu-ray (Williams, 2008). While the war was won by the Blu-
ray format in 2008, Microsoft refused to integrate Blu-ray in the Xbox production, instead
deciding to concentrate on digital content (Hartley, 2008b). To date, the Xbox models still
do not include a Blu-ray player, cf. Table 4.
The most important technological advances in the game consoles market during the sev-
enth generation have been motion controlling technology led by Nintendo’s Wii (Nintendo,
2013a), 3D technology led by Sony (Goss, 2010), and increasing online content and other
services at Xbox LIVE and PlayStation Network (Microsoft Xbox, 2013d; Sony PlayStation,
2013d).
Microsoft’s answer to motion controlling technology is the Kinect for Xbox 360, launched
in November 2010 (Microsoft Xbox, 2013a; Smith, 2011a). Kinect is a peripheral device,
which can read movement and recognize sounds (Microsoft Xbox, 2013a). It has gained more
attention and sold more copies than the corresponding PlayStation Move and PlayStation Eye
by Sony (Sony PlayStation, 2013c; Smith, 2011a; Jackson, 2010).
Sony has included 3D technology to its console models from early on, whereas Microsoft
has been slower to adopt 3D (Goss, 2010; Chacksfield, 2011a; Whitehorn, 2012). The 3D
technology is not yet fully accessible to normal household consumers due to the high prices
of the technology, and clumsiness of 3D goggles has had the customers suspicious about
the products (Carter, 2011; Solomon, 2012). The main uses of the technology remain in the
movie theatres rather than being the part of the entertainment systems at home (Solomon,
2012). However, the sales of the 3D systems have been increasing over the last few years,
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indicating that 3D could become more important in the future (Carter, 2011), although there
are also those who think that 3D is an infeasible feature (Solomon, 2012, 2013).
On the digital content and services side Sony has been slightly faster to adopt the on demand
concept, which means offering such entertainment services as Netflix, BBC iPlayer and Hulu
Plus, where the customer can download content such as TV programs and movies based on
a subscription fee for services (or their bundles) (Sony PlayStation, 2013d). On the contrary,
Microsoft has been more successful in promoting its Xbox LIVE service for the gamers
(Totilo, 2012).
Microsoft has been catching up with PlayStation’s supply of on demand content as well, now
offering a selection of the most popular content services for Xbox (Microsoft Xbox, 2013d).
Nevertheless, looking at the content subject to charge, Totilo (2012) ranks Sony’s PSN Plus
service over the Xbox LIVE Gold service, as it includes more games. Since neither company
publishes the numbers for paying subscriptions, it is hard to decide which system fares better
considering the offered content.
The future of the game consoles
As both Sony and Microsoft have almost equal standing in the global market at the moment,
the opportunities and threats the companies are facing are mostly the same for both. Growing
BRIC markets mentioned in the beginning of the chapter (O’Neill, 2001; Wilson et al., 2011)
present a larger future market for the consoles. Ever growing concerns over social respon-
sibilities of the firms are likely going to continue to exert more and more pressure on the
production conditions of the console parts (Rivington, 2007b), energy usage of the consoles
(Rivington, 2007a), and overall ethical behaviour of the firms.
The advances in technology present opportunities for both console makers. Whereas Mi-
crosoft has been investing in the motion controlling technology, Sony has concentrated early
on the 3D capabilities of the PlayStation console (Goss, 2010; Smith, 2011a). Blu-ray discs
are becoming more affordable and more common, meaning that Microsoft will likely need to
add a Blu-ray drive sometime in the future (cf. Hartley, 2008b). Granted, there is a possibility
that Blu-ray could become completely obsolete if online media content and clouds become
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more prevalent (e.g. Chacksfield, 2011b).
Other technological advances include cloud gaming and multiple platforms (Robinson, 2011;
Chacksfield, 2011b). Whereas cloud services for consoles are still taking baby steps, Mi-
crosoft has moved on with the SmartGlass project, promising a hybrid gaming between
tablets and the Xbox console (Evans, 2013). Content providing is one of the current com-
petitive war zones between the firms, and it is likely to continue to be so in the future (Sony
PlayStation, 2013d; Microsoft Xbox, 2013d). The threats of the future also include com-
petition from the old enemies such as PC gaming and mobile gaming, and from the new
rivals cloud gaming (OnLive Platform) and new console ventures (Ouya) (Robinson, 2011;
Fitzsimmons, 2012).
The Wii U is a first mover in the eight generation of the consoles, and being a more advanced
than the previous version of the Nintendo console, it might pose a threat to the current genera-
tion of the other two consoles (Nintendo, 2013a). After all, the two consoles are now moving
closer to Wii’s consumer segment of casual gamers with their motion controlling devices (cf.
Microsoft Xbox, 2013a; Sony PlayStation, 2013c). For now, it seems that Sony is the first
one to launch the next generation console, and start the battle for the dominance of the eight
generation gameplay and entertainment (Rivington, 2013; Fitzimmons, 2013).
3.3 Hypotheses
The first research question of this thesis asks how the companies compete against each other.
In order to answer the question, I am setting hypotheses for statistical inference based on the
previous research reviewed in the literature review, and the case specifics presented in the
sections 3.1 and 3.2 above.
The second research question asks whether the method of Chernoff faces can help to clarify
competitive dynamics modeling. Although Chernoff faces cannot be used as a statistical
testing tool, the results of the statistical inference for the hypotheses can be compared to the
generated faces. The used statistical methods and Chernoff faces are discussed in more detail
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in the next chapter.
I am following Nair and Selover (2012) in setting the hypotheses, as the object of interest
in their study is a single pair of competitive firms (dyad) following the competitive dynam-
ics discourse discussed in the literature review (e.g. Chen, 1996). Similarly, the theoretical
framework of this study has been built to reflect the dyadic nature of competition between
two firms (cf. Figure 6).
In the same way than Coca-Cola and Pepsi, which are the companies under the examination
in Nair and Selover (2012)’s study, Microsoft and Sony have customarily been seen as a
competitive pair in the game consoles market. In order to study whether the companies see
each other as symmetric competitors (cf. Chen, 1996), Nair and Selover (2012) examine
whether the data includes significant interlinked behaviour.
Interlinked behaviour is the basic assumption behind the competitive dynamics awareness-
motivation-ability framework as it was discussed in the literature review (cf. Chen, 1996;
Ferrier, 2001; Yu and Cannella, 2007). Following Nair and Selover (2012)’s hypothesis one,
the first hypothesis of this study is formulated as:
Hypothesis 1. Competitive moves between Microsoft and Sony display an interlinked rela-
tionship. The strategic moves of the companies follow each other.
H0: There are no signs of interlinked behaviour.
H1: Competitive moves display an interlinked behaviour.
Nair and Selover (2012) also examine the previous research’s results of mutual forbearance
behaviour in the beverage market. As discussed in the literature review, the mutual forbear-
ance theory posits that when the companies become familiar with the other firm, the aggres-
siveness of the competition reduces (Yu et al., 2009; Ma, 1998; Baum and Korn, 1999; Jayan-
chandran et al., 1999). Some researchers have also found evidence of a U-shaped relationship
between multimarket contact and mutual forbearance (Baum and Korn, 1999; Haveman and
Nonnemaker, 2000, cf. Figure 5).
In this study the observation period is shorter than the time that the companies have spent
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competing together in other markets (including the market for the previous generation of
game consoles). Therefore I cannot test the U-shaped relationship between multimarket con-
tact and the number of attacks like in Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) or Baum and Korn
(1999). However, I am still curious to find out whether the competition attenuates when the
console market matures and the companies learn more about each other’s behaviour for this
generation as the mutual forbearance theory suggest.
Hypothesis 2. Competitive moves between the companies decrease in number over time as
the companies get more familiar with each other’s moves.
H0: The amount of competitive moves remains the same.
H1: The amount of competitive moves decreases.
The final hypotheses of Nair and Selover (2012) concentrate on the dominant firm position, id
est which company is initiating the attacks, and who is following whom. The authors use the
brand value comparison executed by Interbrand to compare Coke’s and Pepsi’s brand values
in order to determine which company is the brand leader. Consequently they determine that
the leading firm Coke is the most dominant, as it also is the market and the price leader over
the observed time period (Nair and Selover, 2012).
In the game consoles market, the first-mover Microsoft leads the global market slightly, while
also leading the sales in the US (VGChartz, 2013a). Microsoft has also been the historic
price leader, having been able to offer Xbox cheaper than the PS3 in the beginning of the
battle (cf. Table 5). Consequently, I am positing that Microsoft is the dominant firm in the
relationship.
Since both case companies produce other things along with consoles, the company brand
ranking by Interbrand cannot be used in the context of this study. Another brand ranking
company Brandirectory ranks Microsoft Xbox as 206th and Sony PlayStation as 289th in
Global 500 brands (Brandirectory, 2013a,b). Although the reliability of the brand value sur-
veys can be questioned, the Brandirectory survey appears to offer support for Microsoft’s
brand leadership, further supporting the suggestion that Microsoft is the dominating firm in
the relationship.
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The competitive dynamics research has also suggested that sometimes the non-dominant firm
can be the more aggressive one initiating the attacks (Nair and Selover, 2012, cf. also Ferrier
et al., 2002). In the case of Coke and Pepsi, Nair and Selover (2012) get mixed results
depending on the type of the strategic action. In the same manner, in order to find out who is
dominating the strategic behaviour in the game consoles case, I am testing both cases:
Hypothesis 3a. The dominant Microsoft is initiating the attacks.
H0: Microsoft is not initiating the attacks.
H1: Microsoft is initiating the attacks.
Hypothesis 3b. The non-dominant Sony is initiating the attacks.
H0: Sony is not initiating the attacks.
H1: Sony is initiating the attacks.
This chapter has examined the game consoles market and introduced the players, which was
the objective set in the chapter one. Additionally, I have formed the hypotheses for statistical
testing. Test results are presented in the chapters five and six. The next chapter introduces
the statistical tools used in the analysis.
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Figure 8: Research methods outline
4 RESEARCH METHODS
The empirical data described in this chapter are used to answer the research questions. The
first question of how the companies compete with each other is answered by analysing the
gathered data with the methods of statistical data analysis (including Chernoff faces) pre-
sented in this chapter.
The second research question evaluates the method of Chernoff faces in competitive dynamics
modelling. While the final conclusions on the usability of the method are left to the chapter
six of this thesis, the third section of this chapter introduces the graphical statistical method
of Chernoff faces, and describes the Chernoff face variables used in this study.
Figure 8 shows the outline for the chapter. In the first section, I describe the data collection
method of quantitative content analysis, and discuss the process for this study. In the second
section I introduce the tools used in the regular econometric data analysis. The third section
reviews the more unconventional statistical method of Chernoff faces, suggested in this thesis
as a supporting tool for the data analysis.
The data set for this study is quantitative panel data. The summary of the variables other than
the ones generated by the content analysis is presented in the Table 5 below. The data is for
n = 2 entities (firms: Microsoft, Sony), and for T = 24 − 2 = 22 time periods (quarters 2007
Q1-2012 Q2). Therefore there are a total of n ∗ T = 44 observations in the panel data set for
each variable in this study.
51
Obs. Company Quarter Unit sales Dyadic mar- Low price High price
number ket share ($)5 ($)5
1 Microsoft 2007Q1 1388481 0.46 334.00 535.00
2 Sony 2007Q1 1606157 0.54 557.00 669.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Microsoft 2007Q4 3936367 0.49 300.00 483.00
8 Sony 2007Q4 4166406 0.51 445.00 557.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37 Microsoft 2011Q3 1922174 0.42 205.00 308.00
38 Sony 2011Q3 2603361 0.58 256.00 308.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43 Microsoft 2012Q2 1358053 0.44 199.00 299.00
44 Sony 2012Q2 1708165 0.56 249.00 299.00
Table 5: Selected observations on key figures by company and quarter
Because the companies do not publish comparable sales data (cf. Microsoft, 2013b; SCEI,
2013b), I am utilizing a second-hand sales database collected by the industry analyst VGChartz
(VGChartz, 2013a,b). The data provider publishes monthly unit sales data from the most im-
portant markets, and yearly data from the global market (VGChartz, 2013b). In this study, I
have summed the unit sales data quarterly. The market share observations are calculated as a
percentage of the unit sales of the firm i from the total sales of the two competitors.
In order to keep the discussion coherent, I am using the US data to represent the price
changes and model changes for the companies. The data on price and model changes have
been collected from the companies, where available (Microsoft, 2013a; Xbox Press Cen-
ter, 2012; Sony, 2013), and double checked against the more comprehensive Wikipedia lists
(Wikipedia, 2013a,b).
With the purpose of making the prices comparable over time, they are adjusted for infla-
tion, and presented in 2012 dollars using the US figures for the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
(Bureau for Labor Statistics, 2013). Only two price-model variables are offered for each com-
pany for each quarter: the price for the cheapest, most basic model offered during the time
5Prices adjusted for inflation and presented in 2012 dollars.
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period, and the price for the most expensive model offered during the time period. In reality,
the companies have offered several models with different specifications of their consoles, as
it can be seen from the Wikipedia lists (Wikipedia, 2013a,b). As discussed in the previous
chapter, this is due to the fast pace of technological change in the game consoles market,
forcing the companies to reinvent their products regularly.
As the United States is one of the key markets for both companies, the competitive dynam-
ics awareness-motivation-ability framework posits that the companies are likely competing
aggressively with each other (e.g. Chen, 1996; Chen and Stucker, 1997; Yu and Cannella,
2007). Consequently, I choose Microsoft as the focal firm, and Sony as the rival firm, as
the United States is the home country for Microsoft. The data is analysed with the statistical
freeware program R (www.r-project.org) and the statistical program SPSS.
4.1 Quantitative content analysis
The method of quantitative content analysis was developed in the 1960s based on the newspa-
per analyses from the 1920s (Sjøvaag and Stavelin, 2012). In addition to journalism research,
the method is used in such fields as sociology, psychology and business (Neuendorf, 2002).
Sjøvaag and Stavelin (2012) concentrate specifically on quantitative analysis of online news-
paper content, which is also the data source for this study.
Jauch et al. (1980) suggest that content analysis can be utilized in organization research,
including researching strategies. The competitive dynamics researchers have taken Jauch
et al. (1980)’s approach and adopted quantitative content analysis as the main method of
development and testing hypotheses in studying competitive actions of firms (e.g. Young
et al., 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001).
Quantitative content analysis can be conducted either manually or by computer assisted meth-
ods (Neuendorf, 2002; Sjøvaag and Stavelin, 2012). The sample data in this thesis is gathered
and coded manually. Sjøvaag and Stavelin (2012) advice to start by assessing whether the
research questions and hypotheses can be answered by the chosen method. In this thesis the
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purpose is to quantify the reactions of two competing firms, and find competitive patterns
from them with statistical methods. Therefore quantitative content analysis appears to be the
right method for this thesis.
The second stage is to use inductive or deductive coding to create a codebook of keywords
(Sjøvaag and Stavelin, 2012). The authors suggest that previous studies and codebooks
should be used as far as possible, as they have been validated through use (ibid.). Table
6 presents previously done studies on competitive actions, and examines their coding cate-
gories and keywords. Most of the studies do not provide a list of the used keywords, how-
ever, the ones that do (Ferrier et al., 2002; Upson et al., 2012) are included in the list as
examples.
Introducing new products or making changes into the existing products due to the advances
in technology is a competitive action category mentioned in all of the studies. Some studies
have also gone further and separated categories for new technologies (Yu et al., 2009). Ser-
vice actions such as after-sales services can also be thought to be part of the product action
category, however, some of the studies consider this as a separate category (Ferrier, 2001;
Ferrier et al., 2002; Yu and Cannella, 2007; Yu et al., 2009).
Yu and Cannella (2007) categorize product actions into two different action types: minor
and major product action. Product redesign, modification, use of new technology, and annual
model introduction are considered as minor actions, whereas major actions correspond to sub-
stantial investments, new product introductions, and technology breakthroughs (ibid.).
Changes in pricing and marketing actions are also categories considered in all of the studies.
Cost and quality based strategies such as pricing, marketing, and product design are tradi-
tional sources of competitive advantage (e.g. Hamel and Prahalad, 1989), and hence it is not
surprising to see the categories in all of the studies. Other categories considered by the pre-
vious researchers include capacity, geography, signalling and organizational changes.
Yu and Cannella (2007) define capacity actions as changes in company’s capacity or output.
Derfus et al. (2008) explain that increasing capacity is one of the possible ways to deter entry
in markets. Geographic actions refer to entry and exit of the firms from each other’s markets
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Coding category Keywords Studies
product introductions, introduce, launch, Young et al. (1996); Ferrier et al. (2002);
product actions unveil, roll out Ferrier (2001); Derfus et al. (2008);
Yu et al. (2009); Upson et al. (2012)
major product action not available Yu and Cannella (2007)
minor product action not available Yu and Cannella (2007)
technology innovations not available Yu et al. (2009)
service actions, distribu- service, warrantee, Ferrier (2001); Yu and Cannella (2007);
tion and after-sales service guarantee, financing Ferrier et al. (2002); Yu et al. (2009)
pricing price, rate, dis- Ferrier (2001); Upson et al. (2012);
count, rebate Ferrier (2001); Derfus et al. (2008);
Ferrier (2001); Yu and Cannella (2007)
promotional, advertising, ads, spot, promote, Ferrier et al. (2002); Upson et al. (2012);
marketing distribute, campaign Yu et al. (2009); Derfus et al. (2008);
Yu and Cannella (2007); Yu et al. (2009);
Young et al. (1996)
signalling, overt signalling vows, promises, Ferrier (2001); Upson et al. (2012);
actions says, seeks, aims Ferrier et al. (2002)
geographic moves not available Derfus et al. (2008)
capacity, capacity related raises, boosts, Ferrier (2001); Derfus et al. (2008);
actions increases Ferrier et al. (2002); Yu et al. (2009);
Yu and Cannella (2007)
changes in organizational not available Yu et al. (2009)
structure and management
systems
Table 6: Coding categories and keywords in previous studies
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(ibid.). Signalling means sending threatening messages to the rival of the intended action
of the focal firm (Upson et al., 2012). Organizational changes refer to the actions aiming to
restructure the firm in order for it to become more efficient in competing against the rivals
(Yu et al., 2009).
The sample in this thesis is collected and coded manually from Techradar news archive con-
taining console news published between January 2007 and June 2012. Techradar is the UK
market leader in online entertainment and video games news and reviews, and it is a part of
the Britain based Future Plc. media group (Future plc., 2012; Techradar, 2013).
The site was chosen as it offers access to the game consoles news archive throughout the
sample period unlike most of the online console news services. Additionally, Future Plc.
has official partnerships with both case companies Future plc. (2012). The reliability of
the web service can be tested against the publications in other comparable services (e.g.
www.engadget.com), and the annual reports of the case firms (Microsoft, 2013a; Sony, 2013).
Table 7 lists the coding categories and keywords developed for this thesis. Coding categories
and keywords are based on the previous studies, and adapted to match the style of the data
source Techradar. Table 7 also provides example headlines in each category.
The third stage of content analysis after codebook formulation is to define the sample (Sjø-
vaag and Stavelin, 2012). The process for this study included first searching for the news
articles on console news in the Techradar news archive, organizing them by date, and collect-
ing every news article, which mentioned Xbox 360, Microsoft, PlayStation 3, or Sony. I then
read all the articles, retaining those, which clearly belonged to one or more of the categories
defined in the Table 7. I then used numerical coding to code the articles accordingly to the
categories console manufacturer i: 1=Microsoft, 2=Sony, year i: 1=2007, . . . , 6=2012, and
category i: 1=product, . . . , 6=signalling.
The final stages of content analysis according to Sjøvaag and Stavelin (2012) include check-
ing for mistakes, and revising the codebook and the categories. During the coding process,
I redefined the categories by adding relevant keywords. As some of the articles discuss both
case companies and several different actions, I reread the articles and separated the different
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Coding Keywords Example
category
product introduce, launch, unveil, reveal, On Friday the 120 GB Xbox
action add, offer, change, announce, 360 Elite will be launched on
switch, update, release, debut, British shores.
design, hardware, revision, version
service service, warranty, fix, content, Microsoft to fix all broken
action access, application, support, down- Xbox 360 consoles.
load, firmware, software, security
pricing price, rate, discount, rebate, cost Kinect costs same as Xbox
action 360 console.
marketing ads, promote, distribute, campaign, Sky Player on Xbox launches
action claim, boost, bundle, pitch today, with a bundle that includes
a media remote, a month of Sky
Sports and a three-month Gold
membership subscription available
for £29.99.
capacity raises, boosts, increases, acquires, Microsoft has moved to acquire
action production, patent, developers the Xbox8.com domain name.
signalling vows, promises, says, seeks, Microsoft was also proud to
action aims, mention, trumpet, talks, trumpet the fact that it’s
states, works on, strategy, threat, been able to maintain its lead
leaves, concentrates on, announces, over Sony and Nintendo in terms
claims, reacts, hints, expects, job of total money spent by gamers
advertising, boast on hardware and software.
Table 7: Coding categories and keywords in this study
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sales action outsells, sells, sales, battle, The Xbox 360’s sales victory
victory, lose, ship, profit, comes after Microsoft sold a
loss, fail, compete staggering 270,000 of the consoles
in January 2012.
games action exclusive, game, publishes, Today sees the release of the much
special edition, limited edition mooted Halo 3 game for the Xbox 360.
Table 8: Adding extra action categories based on the data review
actions for each company. Thus one article can be a source for several actions, or for both
companies.
Additionally, I created categories called Sales (i=7) and Games (i=8) presented in the Table
8. The sales action category tracks the posts related to the battle of the sales figures reported
regularly on Techradar. The action is marked to the company, which is leading the sales
according to the news report. The games category includes the news on the game deals and
publications for each company.
Jauch et al. (1980) state that for the sake of validity it is important to have multiple raters,
whose interrater reliability is assessed with a correct measure. Similarly, Chen (1996, 2009)
emphasizes the use of industry informants in validation of the data collection when data is
collected by the content analysis.
Validity is not an excessive issue for this thesis, since the purpose of the empirical part of
this thesis is to function as an example of an analysis of competitive actions rather than a
comprehensive analysis of a complete database. Nevertheless, I provide exact information
on the research design, and the validity of the results can be checked by trained coders in a
different setting if needed.
In total, there were n = 311 competitive actions in the data. The summary of the data
generated with the content analysis can be seen in the Table 9. Each of the used categories
is large enough for statistical analysis, although the service and the signalling categories are
marginally larger than the other six categories for both companies.
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Action Microsoft Sony Total actions
C1:Product 21 16 37
C2:Service 34 31 65
C3:Pricing battle 16 16 32
C4:Marketing 18 11 29
C5:Capacity 7 12 19
C6:Signalling 39 33 72
C7:Sales battle 19 11 30
C8:Games 16 11 27
Total actions 170 141 311
Table 9: Action category breakdown by companies
Figure 9 describes the breakdown of the actions for both companies. In the figures it can be
seen that signalling and service actions are the two most often used actions for both firms.
Microsoft has been flagged the winner in the articles for more times than Sony, which cor-
roborates the finding in the chapter 3 that Microsoft is the sales leader. Product, marketing,
and games action bars are also higher for Microsoft than Sony, while Sony has a higher ca-
pacity bar. The pricing bars are equally high for both companies. The content data appears
to suggest that Microsoft is the more aggressive player in the relationship.
Figure 10 shows combined action counts across the observed time periods. The most actions
observed are in the beginning of the time series, when Sony has just made the entrance to the
market. Visible peaks in the activity data can be seen in the quarters Q1 2007, Q2 2007, Q4
2008, Q2 2010, and Q2 2012.
4.2 Econometric methods
In this section I am reviewing the conventional statistical tools used in the data analysis. I
utilize econometric measures used in previous research in order to statistically test the hy-
potheses presented in the previous chapter, and in order to find a comparison point for the
Chernoff faces, which are presented in the next section.
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Figure 9: Action breakdowns
Figure 10: Content data time series breakdown
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Time series name Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
High price Microsoft ($) 299.00 535.00 365.18 81.69
Low price Microsoft ($) 199.00 334.00 238.18 48.97
High price Sony ($) 299.00 669.00 447.59 132.61
Low price Sony ($) 249.00 557.00 364.64 107.97
Unit sales Microsoft 1023343 7521471 2699635 1892976
Unit sales Sony 962452 6936351 2900906 1695482
Log sales Microsoft 13.84 15.83 14.63 0.57
Log sales Sony 13.78 15.75 14.74 0.53
Total actions Microsoft 1 25 7.36 6.57
Total actions Sony 1 17 6.36 4.80
Log actions Microsoft 0.00 3.22 1.64 0.89
Log actions Sony 0.00 2.83 1.54 0.87
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of the variables used
The data analysis utilizes the data described in the beginning of this chapter, including the
primary data generated by the content analysis presented in the section 4.1. In order to get
meaningful results with the number of observations in the data set, the action categories
are grouped as one variable called total actions for each company. Table 10 includes the
minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values for the time series used in the
statistical testing.
The time series pairs used in the statistical testing are total actions, sales, high price, and low
price for each company. Log sales have lower variances than the sales variables, so the sales
are transformed to log sales. Total actions have quite high variances as well, so the series are
transformed to log actions.
As I have constructed similar hypotheses than Nair and Selover (2012), I am also using
similar methods for obtaining the test results. The tests used are cointegration test, Goldfeld-
Quandt test, and Granger causality test. I review each method and their assumptions shortly
below; the results are reported in the next chapter.
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Cointegration test
The cointegration test is used to examine whether there is a long term interdependent rela-
tionship between two firms (Nair and Selover, 2012). Cointegration measures whether two
non-stationary time series are cointegrated, or if the behaviour of one time series can be
predicted by looking at the behaviour of the other time series (Chen, 2011).
Cointegration test is done by first checking that the time series are non-stationary integrated
of order one series, or I(1)-type series where the trend can be removed by differentiating
the series once (Chen, 2011). On the contrary, the stationary I(0)-type series do not present
visible trend (ibid.). The linear relationship between the two series is then estimated by
graphing the series in order to see if they share a stochastic trend and by conducting the
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Chen, 2011; Stock and Watson, 2012).
The cointegration residual terms should be stationary, which can be checked with a unit root
test (Chen, 2011; Stock and Watson, 2012). Stock and Watson (2012) warn that the test is
often not reliable, as the OLS estimator tends to have a non-normal distribution, which leads
to misleading inferences based on its t-statistic. Therefore the authors urge to use common
sense, economic theory, and graphs in order to confirm the results (ibid.).
The steps utilized in this thesis are:
1. Checking if the two corresponding time series are stationary by graphing the series and
checking if there is a significant trend component. Confirming the trend by calculating
autocorrelations for each series.
2. Using R to compute the OLS regression and the unit roots to test for cointegration, in
case the previous step proved that the time series were non-stationary.
3. Reporting the test results for each time series pair.
Goldfeld-Quandt test
Goldfeld-Quandt test is used to examine whether the number of actions decreases or increases
significantly over two different time periods (Nair and Selover, 2012). The variant that Nair
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and Selover (2012) use is constructed as the ratio of residual sum of squares ERR2ERR1 , where the
two residuals are calculated from two regressions on the first third and the last third of the
observations of two time series. The test assumes a normal distribution of the error terms and
no serial correlation (Nair and Selover, 2012).
The steps utilized in this thesis are
1. Checking the error terms distributions and serial correlation.
2. Conducting the test by using the variant used in Nair and Selover (2012)’s study.
3. Reporting the test results for each time series pair.
Granger causality test
Granger causality test is used to examine relationships between two time series (Nair and
Selover, 2012). Granger causality test’s null hypothesis is that the regressor time series does
not contain any predictive content of the regressand series, or that the coefficients on all lags
of the regressor series are zero (Stock and Watson, 2012). Stock and Watson (2012) note that
from the semantics point of view the test is a measure of predictability rather than causality,
which means that if X Granger-causes Y, then X can be used to predict Y’s behaviour but any
causal interpretations should not be drawn on the basis of the test only.
The test assumes the basic time series regression model assumptions (Wooldridge, 2009;
Stock and Watson, 2012). The residual terms must have conditional mean zero for both re-
gressors and the lags included, the series must be stationary or the non-stationary series must
be transformed, large outliers are rare, and there is no perfect multicollinearity (ibid.).
The steps utilized in this thesis are:
1. Discussing the applicability of Granger causality test to the variables of this study.
2. Running the test for all the possible cases.
3. Reporting the test results for each time series pair.
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Figure 11: Examples of Chernoff faces
4.3 Chernoff faces as a method of analysis
This section discusses Chernoff faces, and the reasoning behind their use in this Master’s
thesis. I first describe the epistemological and ontological background of the faces, and then
examine examples of studies where Chernoff faces have been utilized previously.
At the end of this section I evaluate the usability of the faces in the context of competitive
actions based on the experiences of the previous research, and describe the design of the
faces for this study. The description of the method in this section lays down the basis for the
discussion in the chapter six, where I answer the second research question of how Chernoff
faces could be used to help to model competitive dynamics.
Background of Chernoff faces
Chernoff faces is a statistical method of depicting multivariate data in the form of cartoon
faces (Chernoff, 1973). There is a maximum number of 18 variables, which each describe
facial characteristics, such as the size and shape of the head, angle of the eyebrows, curvature
of the mouth, size of the eyes, or direction of the eyes (Nel et al., 1994). Chernoff faces
are especially useful in presenting a visual image of changes in time series (Chernoff, 1973).
Figure 11 depicts three examples of Chernoff faces generated by the statistical program R’s
TeachingDemos package’s faces2 function (cf. Snow, nd).
According to Chernoff (1973, p.363) pictures have four different functions:
1. They can help to understand the data more quickly.
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2. They can function as mnemonics.
3. They can facilitate communication.
4. They can help with calculation.
Chernoff (1973) argues that the faces are useful in the first two ways. When the human
mind is processing the data from human interaction in real life, it draws a caricature of a
face according to different facial expressions in order to be able to concentrate on the most
important messages (ibid.). The faces try to mimic this same process: Figure 11 depicts
simple caricatures of faces, which utilize different facial features to express differences in
data (ibid.).
Chernoff (1973) ponders if subjective interpretation plays a part in assessing facial diagrams.
Similarly, Huff et al. (1981) are worried about the cases where one can add emotional differ-
ences to the faces, even if the data does not include any emotional inferences. In contrast,
Apaiwongse (1995) evaluates that one of the benefits of the Chernoff faces is exactly in the
way Chernoff faces can be used to depict those data sets, which include emotional nuances
such as whether a company is doing better or worse than at previous period. The author
claims that Chernoff faces are a quick way of depicting this type of data, whereas other meth-
ods may not emphasize the emotional differences at all (Apaiwongse, 1995).
The use of Chernoff faces in research
Chernoff faces have previously been used in business research by Nel et al. (1994) to study
service quality from customer point of view, and Huff et al. (1981), who present the fail-
ure data of firms by utilizing Chernoff faces. Golden and Sirdesai (1992) demonstrate how
Chernoff faces can be used to measure brand development in consumer study. Apaiwongse
(1995) uses the faces to measure uncertainty and the success of business environmental poli-
tics.
Huff et al. (1981) is one of the first applications of the faces on business data. They suggest
that Chernoff faces could be used in historical data analysis in demonstrating time series of
product strategies, brand development, sales figures, competitive strategies, and changes in
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the business environment. Similarly, Golden and Sirdesai (1992) claim that Chernoff faces
are an especially good method for behaviour and strategy researchers, whose data is usually
complex and the variables complicated.
According to Golden and Sirdesai (1992) comparisons between several different data sets
are easy with the faces, and the advantage of the Chernoff faces is that the overall picture is
easier to interpret from a visual image than from a table. Continuing with the interpretation
argument, Nel et al. (1994) try the method of Chernoff faces because they want to present their
multivariate service quality data in an easily understandable format. According to them the
top management and researchers are able to understand complicated models, but the middle
management and customer service personnel can benefit from an easier way to interpret the
data (Nel et al., 1994).
Chernoff faces in this study
The most important advantages from the use of the faces according to the previous research
are the simplicity of the faces in explaining complex multivariate data to a large audience
(Nel et al., 1994), and the use of the faces in comparing complicated time series data in order
to see the overall picture and the possible emotional nuances (Golden and Sirdesai, 1992;
Apaiwongse, 1995).
The most likely audiences for competitive moves analysis are the competition researchers
and the managers of the competitive firms. Though the researchers who are familiar with
statistical methods of time series analysis are unlikely to gain too much insight from the use
of Chernoff faces, could the top management who need to be able to efficiently and quickly
to interpret data results benefit from the data presented in the facial format. Additionally,
looking the data from the overall vantage point might help to improve the statistical insights
gained from competitive research data.
The face variables chosen for this study include the content variables described in the section
4.1 (product, service, pricing, marketing, capacity, signalling, sales, games), the dyadic mar-
ket share measure measuring the piece of the market divided between the two firms, log sales
of the companies, and the prices for high and low end models. The same data is analysed
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with the statistical tools introduced in the section 4.2; as discussed in this section, Chernoff
faces form a visual representation of the competitive dynamics between the firms.
Chernoff (1973) considers which variable the audience of the facial diagram will concentrate
on, and advices to try different combinations of the variables in order to see whether the
places of the variables matter. Nel et al. (1994) agree with Chernoff and Rizv (1975) that the
most important variables should subjectively be selected to correspond to the most important
facial features so that the data will not disappear in the formation of the faces. Apaiwongse
(1995) refers to De Soete and De Corte (1985)’s study, where the authors found the most
important features in the faces are the curvature of the mouth, the length of the face, the size
of the eyes, and the length of the eyebrows.
The Chernoff faces variables chosen for this study are presented in the Table 11 below. The
function faces2 in the R package has a predesigned order of the facial features from 1 to 18:
1=Width of center, . . . , 18=Width of Eyebrows (Snow, nd). The variable zero in the table
represents the quarterly time variable, which is used as labels for each face. As suggested by
Chernoff (1973) and Nel et al. (1994), several feature and variable combinations were tested
in order to generate the final facial set, which presents the information of the variables as
deemed subjectively best by the researcher.
As it can be seen from the Table 11, some of the variables are attached to more than one
feature in order to emphasize the importance of the variable and allow for natural movement
of facial features. For example, to represent a growing dyadic market share, the first three
features, which all are related to the shape and size of the face, are attached to the market
share variable. Therefore the face appears relatively bigger in comparison for the company,
which has a larger market share.
Table 11: Description of the Chernoff face variables
Facial feature Variable Variable Explanation
number
Labels 0 Time Face series labels: Quarterly
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Continued
Width of center 1 Market share Bigger head means bigger
market share
Top vs. Bottom width 2 Market share Bigger head means bigger
(height of split) market share
Height of Face 3 Market share Bigger head means bigger
market share
Width of top half 4 High price Smaller means a price reduc-
tion
Width of bottom half 5 Low price Smaller means a price reduc-
tion
Length of Nose 6 C5:Capacity Longer nose means more
capacity actions
Height of Mouth 7 C7:Sales Lower means more sales
actions
Curvature of Mouth 8 Log sales More curved means bigger
sales
Width of Mouth 9 Log sales Wider means bigger sales
Height of Eyes 10 C1:Product Higher means more product
actions
Distance between 11 C8:Games More distant means more
Eyes games actions
Angle of Eyes/Eye- 12 C6:Signalling Looking angrier means more
brows signalling actions
Circle/Ellipse of Eyes 13 C6:Signalling More squinted eyes mean
more signalling actions
Size of Eyes 14 C4:Marketing Bigger means more marketing
actions
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Continued
Position Left/Right of 15 C3:Pricing Looking left means more pricing
Eyeballs/Eyebrows actions
Height of Eyebrows 16 C2:Service Higher eyebrows mean more
service actions
Angle of Eyebrows 17 C6:Signalling Looking angrier means more
signalling actions
Width of Eyebrows 18 C2:Service Wider eyebrows mean more
service actions
Face series for quarterly data were generated for each company based on the chosen variables.
The process resulted in 22 faces for both firms. The results are discussed in the next chapter,
and the complete facial sets for each company can be found from the appendices. The use of
the faces in competitive action research is further evaluated in the chapter six.
The objective for this chapter set in the beginning of this thesis was to research the inter-
actions between the players by conducting a structured content analysis, and to introduce
the methods used in the statistical data analysis. Next chapter reports the results of the data
analysis.
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5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. The first section reports the results of
the econometric analysis, and the second section discusses the results of the Chernoff faces
analysis. The results presented in this chapter are synthesized with the case and the literature
in the following chapter.
5.1 Results of the statistical analysis
The process for each test follows the steps described in the previous chapter. Complete graphs
are only presented for selected examples in order to keep the report concise and clear.
5.1.1 Cointegration test results
The first step of the cointegration test is to check if the time series present a significant trend
(nonstationary series) or if they are stationary (no trend, random) (Wooldridge, 2009). This
can be done by graphing the time series (ibid.). Figure 12 presents the graphs for Microsoft
and Sony’s logged total actions across the time periods.
It can be seen that while the observations peak during the early 2007 periods for both com-
panies, Microsoft data does not appear to have a trend, whereas the Sony data presents a
slight downward sloping trend. Autocorrelations can be used to confirm the visual results
(Wooldridge, 2009). The autocorrelation graphs for the total actions series for each company
are presented in the Figure 13.
The autocorrelations graph confirms that Microsoft’s total actions autocorrelation coefficients
are not significant at 5 % confidence limit except for the lags 19 and 20. Additionally, there
does not seem to be a pattern in the residuals. The Sony total action series has some sig-
nificant autocorrelation coefficients with the lags 1, 19 and 20, and the residuals seem to
form a downward sloping pattern. The results imply that while Microsoft total actions are a
stationary series, Sony’s series present some nonstationary properties.
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Figure 12: Time series comparison for logged total actions series
Figure 13: Autocorrelations for total actions
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Figure 14: Time series comparison for high price series
Figures 14 and 15 present the same process for the high price series for each company. In the
high price case the both time series are clearly the type I(1) non-stationary series confirmed
by highly significant autocorrelation coefficients and patterned residuals visible in the Figure
15.
Log sales present only a slight upward sloping trend when graphed, and there are some signif-
icant autocorrelation coefficients in both series. However, the residuals do not form a pattern
in either series, implying stationary series. Low price series present similar tendencies than
the high price series described above.
Table 12 presents the summary of the autocorrelation and stationary results. Autocorrelation
is confirmed by running the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation (Hanke and Wichern,
2005). Table 13 includes the cointegration test results. If the cointegration test cannot be run,
R2 is included as an estimate of the relationship between the two series.
The cointegration test is not run for log action and log sales, because the series are not the
right type, as seen in the Table 12. The OLS results suggest that log sales follow each other
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Figure 15: Autocorrelations for high price series
Series Durbin-Watson Autocorrelation Stationary
test
Log total actions 1.5318 > 1.17 Accept null, no auto- Microsoft total actions
correlation at 1 % series are stationary
Log sales 1.5200 > 1.17 Accept null, no auto- Both stationary
correlation at 1 %
Low price 0.6275 < 1.00 Reject null, auto- Both nonstationary
correlation at 1 %
High price 0.3599 < 1.00 Reject null, auto- Both nonstationary
correlation at 1 %
Table 12: Autocorrelation and stationary results
Series Unit root test Cointegration OLS R2 if
stationary
Log actions n/a No test; stationary 0.2430
Log sales n/a No test; stationary 0.8315
Low price −2.5125 < −1.95 Reject null, cointegrated at 5 % n/a
High price −1.8069 < −1.60 Reject null, cointegrated at 10 % n/a
Table 13: Cointegration results
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quite closely, so Microsoft log sales series can be predicted by using the Sony log sales series
quite well, as the Sony observations cover over 80 % of the Microsoft observations. Log
actions series’ R2 is lower around 25 %, so the model’s predictive power is not as good as the
log sales.
Both price series are cointegrated according to the test, which means that there is statistical
evidence that the series follow each other. This indicates that at least the pricing strategies
of the companies are interlinked. Consequently, in the case of the pricing strategies the null
hypothesis H0: There are no signs of interlinked behaviour is rejected in the favour of the
alternative hypothesis H1: Competitive moves display an interlinked behaviour.
5.1.2 Goldfeld-Quandt test results
The first step in the Goldfeld-Quandt test is to check the error term distributions and serial
correlation. In the Figure 16 it can be seen that the errors are distributed around the normal
line in the case of log actions series. Log sales behave in a similar manner. In the pricing
cases the errors do not follow the normal line and there are many clear outliers as shown in
the case of the high price series.
Serial correlation was checked in the previous test, autocorrelation was found in the cases
of the pricing variables. Therefore the Goldfeld-Quandt test is not applicable to the pricing
variables. The test results are summarized in the Table 14.
The test is not significant for the logged actions and logged sales series. This means that there
is no evidence in the data that the either series interactions are decreasing in volatility. The
test could not be run with the pricing series due to serial correlation and non-normal errors.
Therefore the null hypothesis H0: The amount of competitive moves remains the same cannot
be rejected on the basis of the data analysis.
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Figure 16: Regression error normality
Series Normal Goldfeld-Quandt test Volatility
errors
Total actions Yes 0.1635799 < 1.96, Accept null, No evidence of de-
errors are homoscedastic at 10 % creased volatility
Log sales Yes 0.8045471 < 1.96, Accept null, No evidence of de-
errors are homoscedastic at 10 % creased volatility
Low price No No test because errors are not n/a
normal and serial correlation exists.
High price No No test because errors are not n/a
normal and serial correlation exists.
Table 14: Goldfeld-Quandt test results
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Figure 17: Transformed price series: First differentiation of the low price series
5.1.3 Granger causality test results
The first step for the Granger causality test determined in the previous chapter was to consider
the applicability of the test to the variables in this study. The assumptions are the basic
OLS assumptions for multiple variables regression. The OLS assumptions can be seen to
apply to the total actions and log sales series, but the nonstationary pricing series must be
transformed to stationary series. Figures 17 and 18 present the transformed series for low
price models.
Table 15 summarizes the results of the Granger causality test. The results are not significant
except for the high price series, where Sony Granger-causes Microsoft is significant at 10
% level. Based on the Granger causality results the null hypothesis H0: Microsoft is not
initiating the attacks cannot be rejected. There is some statistical support for the alternative
hypothesis H1: Sony is initiating the attacks. However, three out of four strategic variables
fail to reject the null hypothesis H0: Sony is not initiating the attacks.
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Figure 18: Autocorrelations for differentiated low price series
Granger causality Total actions Log sales Low price High price
(diff) (diff)
Microsoft Granger- 0.0102 < 1.43 0.0537 < 1.43 0.0439 < 1.43 0.1512 < 1.43
causes Sony
Sony Granger- 0.4718 < 1.43 0.0293 < 1.43 0.0000 < 1.43 1.4780 > 1.43
causes Microsoft
Table 15: Granger causality test results
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Figure 19: Microsoft vs. Sony 2007
5.2 Chernoff faces results
In order to report the results from the Chernoff faces, I am discussing each year separately.
For each year, figures from 19 to 24 represent the Microsoft faces (top row in the figures)
compared with the Sony faces (bottom row in the figures). The results are reported in tables
from 16 to 21 where each action category is compared between the faces and the more ag-
gressive face is reported as the winner. If the faces do not differ significantly on the basis of
subjective review, the result is reported as even.
The results are summarized for each quarter and year, marking the most aggressive player for
the quarter/year (the company with most action category wins), and the market share winner
for each quarter/year (the biggest head). If the companies have been equally aggressive (or
docile), the summarizing results is reported as even. If the companies have won the quarterly
market share battle at equal times, the yearly result is reported as even.
Pricing strategies are discussed in addition to the table results. Pricing strategy can be de-
termined by comparing the top and bottom halves of the faces. If the top half is larger, the
company is pricing its top model higher in relation to the low model. If the bottom half is
larger, the opposite is true. If the halves are balanced, the pricing is equally balanced between
the models.
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Battle Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Winner
Signalling Sony Microsoft Sony Even Sony
Service Microsoft Microsoft Sony Even Microsoft
Pricing Even Sony Even Even Sony
Capacity Microsoft Microsoft Sony Sony Even
Games Sony Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft
Sales Microsoft Sony Even Microsoft Microsoft
Product Microsoft Sony Sony Sony Sony
Marketing Microsoft Sony Microsoft Sony Even
Most aggressive Microsoft Even Sony Sony Sony
Market share winner Even Microsoft Microsoft Even Microsoft
Table 16: Microsoft vs. Sony 2007
In the first quarter of 2007 the prices for both low and high end models are high for both
companies. There is an indication of the different pricing strategies in the second and third
quarters, where Microsoft is pricing the top model lower and low model higher, and Sony
is doing the opposite. In the fourth quarter the both companies are again pricing the models
evenly.
Microsoft is the market share winner in 2007 by winning in two quarters. Sony is the most ag-
gressive, having shown most signalling, pricing and product actions in most quarters.
In 2008 it can be seen from the shapes of the heads that the companies are following opposite
pricing strategies: In the first two quarters Microsoft is pricing its top model high and the
low end product lower, whereas Sony is pricing the top model low and the low end product
higher. In the last two quarters the pricing strategies switch places.
Both companies win the market share battle in two quarters, so there is no winner in terms of
market share in 2008. Sony continues to be the more aggressive company, winning the action
battle in signalling, services, pricing, capacity, and sales categories. In fact, Microsoft is only
winner in the marketing category.
In 2009 first quarter the pricing strategies continue to be opposite, Microsoft is pricing the top
model low and low model higher, whereas Sony is doing the opposite. Microsoft is pricing
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Figure 20: Microsoft vs. Sony 2008
Battle Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Winner
Signalling Even Sony Even Sony Sony
Service Sony Sony Even Microsoft Sony
Pricing Sony Even Even Even Sony
Capacity Sony Microsoft Sony Even Sony
Games Sony Sony Microsoft Microsoft Even
Sales Microsoft Sony Sony Even Sony
Product Even Microsoft Sony Even Even
Marketing Microsoft Sony Microsoft Even Microsoft
More aggressive Sony Sony Sony Microsoft Sony
Market share winner Sony Sony Microsoft Microsoft Even
Table 17: Microsoft vs. Sony 2008
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Figure 21: Microsoft vs. Sony 2009
Battle Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Winner
Signalling Even Microsoft Even Microsoft Microsoft
Service Microsoft Sony Even Even Even
Pricing Even Even Even Microsoft Microsoft
Capacity Microsoft Even Sony Sony Sony
Games Microsoft Microsoft Sony Even Microsoft
Sales Microsoft Even Even Even Microsoft
Product Even Even Even Microsoft Microsoft
Marketing Microsoft Sony Microsoft Even Microsoft
More aggressive Microsoft Even Sony Microsoft Microsoft
Market share winner Microsoft Even Sony Sony Sony
Table 18: Microsoft vs. Sony 2009
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Figure 22: Microsoft vs. Sony 2010
the two products quite evenly in the last three quarters, whereas Sony is moving on to low
top model and higher low model pricing in the last two quarters.
In 2009 Sony takes the lead in the market share battle, selling more consoles in two quarters.
Microsoft is the more aggressive company in 2009, winning the action battle in signalling,
pricing, games, sales, product, and marketing categories. Sony wins only in the capacity
category.
The pricing strategies seem to be quite even and similar for both companies during this pe-
riod. There is no market share winner in 2010. Microsoft is the more aggressive player,
winning the action battle in the service and the marketing categories. Sony wins the product
category, whereas the rest of the categories are tied between the companies. Neither company
is aggressive in the pricing and sales categories.
In 2011 the pricing strategies are quite even for both companies and similar than during the
previous period. In 2011 Sony is the market share winner taking the market lead in two
quarters. Microsoft is again the more aggressive player, winning the signalling, service,
capacity, product, and marketing categories. Sony wins only in the games category. The
pricing and the sales categories do not have any activity.
In the two first quarters of 2012 both companies continue pricing the products evenly. The
market share win goes again to Sony, whereas Microsoft continues to be more aggressive,
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Battle Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Winner
Signalling Microsoft Even Even Sony Even
Service Even Microsoft Even Even Microsoft
Pricing Even Even Even Even Even
Capacity Even Even Sony Microsoft Even
Games Even Microsoft Even Sony Even
Sales Even Even Even Even Even
Product Even Even Sony Even Sony
Marketing Sony Microsoft Even Microsoft Microsoft
More aggressive Even Microsoft Sony Even Microsoft
Market share winner Sony Sony Microsoft Microsoft Even
Table 19: Microsoft vs. Sony 2010
Figure 23: Microsoft vs. Sony 2011
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Battle Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Winner
Signalling Microsoft Even Microsoft Sony Microsoft
Service Microsoft Even Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft
Pricing Even Even Even Even Even
Capacity Microsoft Even Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft
Games Sony Even Even Even Sony
Sales Even Even Even Even Even
Product Microsoft Even Microsoft Even Microsoft
Marketing Microsoft Sony Even Microsoft Microsoft
More aggressive Microsoft Sony Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft
Market share winner Sony Even Sony Microsoft Sony
Table 20: Microsoft vs. Sony 2011
Figure 24: Microsoft vs. Sony 2012
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Battle Q1 Q2 Winner
Signalling Even Even Even
Service Even Even Even
Pricing Even Even Even
Capacity Even Even Even
Games Even Even Even
Sales Even Even Even
Product Even Microsoft Microsoft
Marketing Even Microsoft Microsoft
More aggressive Even Microsoft Microsoft
Market share winner Sony Sony Sony
Table 21: Microsoft vs. Sony 2012
winning the product and the marketing categories. The rest of the action categories are even
between the companies, neither has been aggressive in them.
Overall, Microsoft is deemed the more aggressive company on the basis of the yearly face
analysis (years 2009-2012 vs. Sony’s lead in 2007 and 2008). Still, Microsoft seems to be
the overall loser in terms of the market share; Sony is leading in over half of the quarters.
On a yearly basis Sony is the market share leader in three years (2009, 2011, and 2012),
whereas Microsoft wins in only one year (2007). Two of the years are a tie between the
companies. Interestingly, the volatility of actions seems to attenuate or at least equalize over
years, resulting in more even results in the tables for later years.
The goal for this chapter set in the beginning was to run a statistical data-analysis including
Chernoff faces, and report the results. The implications of the results of the data analyses
presented in this chapter are discussed further in the following chapter, which also provides
the answers to the research questions, and summarizes the empirical study conducted in this
thesis.
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6 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The first research question guiding this thesis set in the section 1.3 was to find how the
game consoles manufacturers compete against each other. The second research question was
methodological in nature, concentrating on the statistical method of Chernoff faces, and its
usage in dynamic modelling of strategic actions.
I begin this chapter with the first question, gathering the statistical support for the hypotheses
set in the section 3.3 from the results of the data analysis in the chapter five, while reviewing
the case data in the chapter three and utilizing the theoretical framework built in the chapter
two. The second part of this chapter concentrates on the questions around the methodology
for dynamic competition modelling, assessing the usability of the Chernoff faces based on
the experiences gained from this study.
6.1 How do the game console companies compete with each other
In this section I aim to answer the first research question. The section has been divided into
three parts on the basis of the theoretical framework built in the chapter two. The game con-
soles example is set in the theoretical framework, and analysed through the theories discussed
in the literature review.
The first part reviews Microsoft and Sony as a rival dyad, the second part discusses the mar-
ket commonality and resource similarity of the firms, and the third part refers to the results of
the data analysis in order to analyse the nature and volatility of the actions in the game con-
soles example compared to the theories of multimarket competition, and previous empirical
research.
The firms of interest in this study have been Microsoft’s and Sony’s game console operations.
Both companies are multinationals producing other products as well, and both are well recog-
nised throughout the world as leading manufacturers of technological products. The firms are
from the US and Japan, which have been the centres for technological advances in the world
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Figure 25: Establishing rivalry
after the World War II. In the chapter three Microsoft was selected as the focal firm based on
its global sales leadership in the seventh generation game console production. Consequently
Sony is the rival firm trying to upset the competitive balance (cf. Figure 25).
Game consoles are produced from the parts made mainly in the Asian region. The most
important parts of the process are the R&D and product development phases as the products
are both complex and highly technical. The products are distributed through regional centres,
which deliver the merchandise to wholesalers, which then supply the retailers where the
consoles are bought by the end customers. The regional centres are also responsible for the
marketing of the products.
As discussed in the chapter three, the products are used for gaming, but also increasingly
for watching movies and other entertainment content, especially on-demand content such as
movie rentals, TV series, and on-demand game chapters. The gaming side is concentrated
especially on single player, high quality, and movie-like game experiences, which take the
gamer across multi-hour game scenery and dialogue, or two player co-op gaming, where the
games can be played through with a friend. The new motion controlling games add another
dimension to the gaming experience, but mostly motion control adds to the entertainment
section, while also attracting new types of consumers to buy the consoles.
Generally Microsoft and Sony seem to fill the requirements for a global rival dyad, since they
are producing similar products on a similar scale, and are going after the same consumer
segment (cf. Jayanchandran et al., 1999). The firms can therefore be placed in the theoretical
framework as shown in the Figure 25.
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Figure 26: Assessing resource similarity and market commonality
In the theoretical framework the first step towards interlinked competition are the overlapping
levels of market commonality and resource similarity between the firms. In this study I have
chosen to concentrate more on the external market commonality factors discussing different
industry characteristics and describing the game console market environment.
Internal resource similarity factors apart from size, economies of scale and market position
factors have not been mentioned in the context of this study. Examining the left-out factors
marked in cursive in the Figure 26 could possibly offer an avenue for a further study concen-
trating on the resource similarity factors affecting awareness-motivation-capability frame-
work in the game consoles market.
The firms meet up in the global market regularly since their consoles are sold as competing
products to customers. One is rarely talked in the press without mentioning the other. The
fiercest battleground for the seventh generation console productions has been Europe, since
the both companies remain strong in their respective home territories, and the Western Euro-
pean countries represent the next largest markets after the home countries of the firms in the
global scale (VGChartz, 2013b).
The market is a high-concentration global oligopoly because the product development costs
89
of the consoles are too high for smaller players. The technology needed for the consoles is
also protected by patents, which work as additional barriers to entry. In addition to producing
the actual console, the console maker needs also to be prepared to produce high quality
content and games, and it needs to be able to persuade the third party content and game
producers to work with the console specifics.
Especially the last activity demands market power, since the third party developers are not
willing to cover costs for multiple small platforms. A new console venture needs to ensure
that there are enough good quality games either produced by the third party developers or by
the game studios run by the console company. As discussed in the chapter three, Sony was
losing the battle when it was not able to get as many good quality games published for the
console as the competitor Microsoft in the beginning of the seventh generation production
(Goldstein, 2006; Rivington, 2007d,c).
The current console production has been on for seven years counting from the launch of the
Xbox 360 in November 2005. Although there have been expectations for the firms to move
on to a new generation, only Sony has recently announced a new iteration of the PlayStation
console to be launched in the end of 2013 (Fitzimmons, 2013; Rivington, 2013). Continuing
the life spans of the seventh generation consoles makes sense, as the sales of the current
consoles are still strong due to renewal process that each console goes through quite regularly.
In fact, Microsoft has made the last record sales of the Xbox as recently as Q4 2011. This
suggests that the seventh generation game console market is not yet declining in its life cycle
and the companies are unlikely to completely move on to a new iteration of the consoles
yet.
The newest notable improvements to the consoles include motion controlling technology and
3D compatibility, which are certainly helping the current generation to lengthen their life
cycles (Goss, 2010; Smith, 2011a). Additionally, virtual entertainment content is increasing
in importance. It is likely though that the next generation will be pushed through in a few
years time. The future success of the game console manufacturers will also depend on the
success of alternative products such as mobile gaming, cloud gaming and content, return of
the PC gaming, and Nintendo Wii U’s success, as discussed in the chapter three.
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Figure 27: Reviewing the actions and the outcomes
Overall, the examined factors of resource similarity and market commonality imply that the
companies function within the awareness-motivation-capability framework suggested by the
competitive dynamics researchers (e.g. Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001). Being the opposite forces
in the relationship makes sure that the companies are aware of each other and motivated to
compete. As both companies are multinationals on a global scale, they are also capable of
attacking each other all over the world.
The purpose of this thesis has been to find out how the two companies compete. Figure
27 shows the actions and outcomes part of the theoretical framework. The results of the
empirical study implicate that the case companies are competing aggressively. The most
used actions in the content analysis were the signalling actions, meaning that the statements
boosting the own products and belittling the competitive products were widely used by both
companies. The second most often used actions had to do with the content and services
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side of the production. This is not surprising as the direction of the consoles has been from
pure gaming devices towards whole entertainment package for the duration of the seventh
generation.
The most apparent strategies used in the market are pricing and product strategies. The firms
also concentrate greatly on the service and content side. Games produced and third party
game deals are important, but diminishing in importance since multiple third party games
are now available for both consoles. Microsoft is still relying more on the game actions,
whereas Sony has clearly tried to move on from the game-based competition, concentrating
on product development strategies.
The study found some support for the hypothesis one from the cointegration test results pre-
sented in the section 5.1. The price series were found cointegrated, which means that they
seemed to follow each other. The other two time series were stationary, so the test was not
possible. The results of the Chernoff faces in the section 5.2 implied that the firms are reacting
to each other by using opposite pricing strategies and being mutually aggressive throughout
the action categories. Overall, the data seems to support the hypothesis one.
Hypothesis 1 is supported. Competitive moves between Microsoft and Sony
display an interlinked relationship. The strategic moves of the companies are
dynamic and aimed at each other.
The Goldfeld-Quandt test was not possible for the pricing series due to serial correlation and
error non-normality. The test did not show evidence for heteroschedastic errors for either
total actions or sales series. However, this could be due to the data availability, as some series
might not have enough observations to show how the errors are distributed. The Chernoff
faces implied that there in fact is attenuation of the actions over time, as the faces and the
prices both become more and more even between the companies.
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Competitive moves between the compa-
nies decrease in number over time as the companies get more familiar with each
other.
The Granger causality test was done for both Microsoft being the initiating firm, and Sony
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being the initiator of the attacks. The results were not significant for Microsoft Granger-
causing any of the attacks. It is possible that the data availability is again issue with this
test. The Granger causality test was significant at 10 % level for Sony Granger-causing
differentiated high price series, which indicates partial support towards hypothesis 3b. In
terms of the pricing strategies used, it is interesting to note that the Chernoff faces appear to
indicate that the firms are almost always utilizing opposite pricing strategies for their top and
low end models. Looking at the other Chernoff faces results, it does seem that Microsoft is
the one initiating more attacks indicating support towards the hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3a is partially supported. Microsoft is initiating the attacks.
Hypothesis 3b is partially supported. Sony is initiating the attacks.
Overall, it seems that there is evidence that Microsoft and Sony are rivals but that the amount
of actions has decreased from the launch of the products. Thus there is evidence for both
competitive and cooperative outcomes from the multimarket contact between the companies.
As this thesis did not concentrate on specific attacks but rather reviewed and summarized the
total global attacks, it is not possible to say on the basis of this study if the companies utilize
foothold strategies in specific situations. Looking at such micro motives of the companies
could be another possible opportunity for an extension of this study.
Although the market is protected by high entry barriers, signs of hypercompetition have
started to show also in the game consoles market. Such products than Nintendo’s Wii and mo-
bile devices such as Apple’s iPad are attacking niches overlooked by the two main consoles,
and are slowly pushing to the market space of the two giants. The pace of the technological
development has clearly increased since the likes of Wii and iPad hit the market, forcing the
two console makers to reinvent their products and invest more and more in the entertainment
capacity and quality of the devices.
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6.2 How can Chernoff faces help to study dynamic competition
Dynamic competition researchers tend to use econometric tools for the analysis of their data,
but there is no single procedure which would result in reliable analysis, since the data is
usually panel data with high variances and non-normal distributions. As described in the
chapter five, this study too, suffered from such problems.
The competitive dynamics researchers are trying to find better ways to formulate normative
strategy suggestions given the dynamic nature of competitive strategy which can be hard to
model (Ma, 1998; Chen and Stucker, 1997). I am suggesting in this thesis that Chernoff faces
is a helpful graphical tool in addition to the econometric analysis normally used.
Advantages
Normally, statistical results can only be graphed single variable at the time, or sometimes
groups of variables can be shown using two different scales. Chernoff faces summarize all
the observations for single time period in a single picture. Although tables are a clear way
of showing information, Chernoff faces and tabulated results help to visualize the results of
the data analysis in a more concrete way. In this study, the faces helped to see that the action
count appears to be decreasing, and that Microsoft is an aggressive player. Neither of those
results could be determined with the conventional data analysis.
I posit that because the field of strategic competition is fairly dramatic, it would be expe-
dient if the results of the competitive actions studies could be presented in a more visually
appealing manner to account for the dramatics of the changes in the positions of the firms.
Furthermore, visualizing the results could also help the managers of the firms, who could see
the results of their decision-making in a concrete way, making the further decision-making
more efficient.
Additionally, regression analysis as the method for analysing data with high variances and
non-normal error distribution is problematic, and the reliability of the inferences based on
models generated by regular or even adjusted regression methods can be questioned. The
faces work for a small amount of data, and can help to see the data from another angle.
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Disadvantages
The code for Chernoff faces is not the easy to master in R. There exists a better function than
the faces2 function used in this thesis, but it does not have 18 features and the faces are not
as visually appealing. The statistical program Survo coded at the University of Helsinki has
a Chernoff faces function, but Survo is not widely used.
In the faces2 function there are difficulties especially with the curvature of the mouth, which
does not result in logical smiles for the faces. There are other small coding difficulties with
the graphs — nose length scales with the rest of the face and does not reflect the changes
in the data in the right proportion. Although these are more cosmetic faults, if the faces are
used as a visual aid, they would work better if all of the features were logical and easy to
use.
The faces are not used very often in the academic literature, and since cartoon faces are a
different way of showing data, the more traditionally thinking researchers might prefer not to
use them. On a similar line of argument, as Chernoff faces are a subjective tool, their usability
in objective academics can be questioned. Therefore they should not be used as the only tool,
but as a supporting analytical tool besides more rigorous measures. Then, if the inferences
based on the faces are presentable, the faces can at minimum be used to show highlights of
the data for wider audiences.
The objective for this chapter set in the beginning was to model the competition between
Microsoft and Sony, and assess the usability of the Chernoff faces in the analysis of compet-
itive interactions. I have now answered these research questions, and thus also provided an
analysis for the research problem, which was formulated as
How does the competition between Microsoft and Sony compare to the previous
research on other types of businesses and market settings, and how could the
data be presented so that the reliability of the statistical inferences would be
improved?
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concludes the Master’s thesis by summarising the main findings and review-
ing the theoretical contribution in the first section. Additionally, I present some managerial
implications in the section 7.2 and suggestions for further research in the section 7.3.
7.1 Main findings and theoretical contribution
The theoretical framework presented in the section 2.3 of this thesis summarized the literature
considering multimarket competition and competitive strategies available to global firms. The
most important findings from the literature were that the firms needed to be justified as a pair
of competing firms, a rival dyad (Chen, 2009). In order to confirm rivalry between two firms
in the same market, the resource similarity and market commonality components needed to
match, so that the firms were aware of each other, motivated to compete with each other, and
had the resources to battle.
If the internal and external factors matched, the resulting multimarket competition could lead
to two different outcomes: competitive or cooperative. Competitive outcomes could lead to
total war, whereas the cooperative outcomes could lead to total peace, but most often the
firms were acting strategically in such manner that they placed small foothold attacks in
order to keep the competitive balance in place (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Upson et al.,
2012).
The literature suggested that strategic competition between a global rival dyad is likely to lead
into improved products, ongoing development, and eventually in creative destruction as fore-
casted by Schumpeter, the father of competitive dynamics (Ferrier, 2001; Chen, 2009).
Although the firms, which are part of the competitive dyad are likely to win out from the
rivalrous relationship at the end, they need to be careful to protect the market where they are
playing from hypercompetitive outcomes (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). Even the smallest
overlook of a niche can be fatal in terms of the market space, if an outsider born global is able
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to infiltrate the barriers to entry (ibid.). In the times of increasing information asymmetries it
is harder and harder for any rival dyad to remain in power (ibid.).
The findings from the empirical case of the game console giants Microsoft and Sony suggest
that the companies are fighting with each other. Although this study was inconclusive on the
exact relationship (whose actions are driving the other), it was clear that there is a competitive
relationship between the two firms. The study found that Microsoft is the more aggressive
player, but regardless, Sony seems to be the one winning at the moment, having almost caught
up in terms of sales with Microsoft’s overall sales. Additionally, Sony appears to be the first
mover in the eight generation gameplay (Fitzimmons, 2013).
The game consoles market is in a revolutionary point, where the forces of hypercompetition
are trying the boundaries of the entry barriers built by the console makers during the last
twenty years (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1995). The Red Queen effect has already picked up the
pace of the technological advances, giving the market new technologically advanced features
such as Microsoft’s motion controller Kinect and Sony’s PlayStation Move, the Microsoft
SmartGlass project, and Sony’s 3D ventures (Derfus et al., 2008; Smith, 2011a; Goss, 2010;
Evans, 2013). It remains to be seen whether the console makers can keep up with the pace or
if they are overrun by other technologies such as the cloud gaming or the online multiplayer
experiences on PC (Robinson, 2011).
This thesis has used the statistical method of Chernoff faces in order to try out an alternative
method for statistical analysis normally used in the competitive dynamics studies. Compet-
itive dynamics interactions are hard to model because they are presented in the panel data
format, which usually results in problems with serial correlation and otherwise inconsistent
and non-normal data or errors, which again results in unreliable regression models (Yu and
Cannella, 2007). Although there exist a variety of methods to counter these problems, meth-
ods such as Chernoff faces, which visualize the data in k-dimensional space can be found
useful, as they help to understand the data better.
However, this study also found that the faces are difficult to use in the statistical programs (or
have not been popular enough to be coded properly), and in order to produce good faces there
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would need to be a better code than the one used in this study. Additionally, since the faces
have a subjective side, it is important that they are not used as the single tool for analysis,
as subjective inferences may result in heterogenous outcomes. Though all graphical repre-
sentations are subject to manipulation by their creator, given the multidimensional nature of
Chernoff faces, the combinatory possibilities are more pronounced than with the traditional
visual tools.
7.2 Managerial implications
This thesis has contributed towards expanding knowledge on the matter of strategic behaviour
of firms in a globally oligopolistic setting. The managers of these types of firms could learn
new strategic management practices from the examples discussed in this thesis and in the
referred literature.
By being aware of the regularly presenting patterns of behaviour, the managers of these firms
could better monitor and guide their organization towards more complicated strategies against
the other players in the market, and therefore gain more market share. It is also possible that
costly escalations of rivalry could be avoided to some extent if all the managers were aware
of the possible action sequences and scenarios.
Overall, it is important for the managers to note that the world is in constant movement and
that by examining the specific context of each firm with its rival can be beneficial. Awareness
of the escalation of technological development and focus on the right competitor at the right
time can make a difference in the success of a firm even on the global scale. In the game
consoles example the pace of the actions between Microsoft and Sony has started to attenuate
but the volume of the technological advances seems to have increased. These could be signs
for both mutual familiarity between two rivals, which have been meeting in multiple markets
for a while, or signs for outside forces penetrating the market entry barriers.
Chernoff faces could be used as the tool along with other statistical methods to both coun-
teract the data problems and to see the whole picture at once. Content analysis is of course
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a backward looking method for collecting data, and not much can be determined of strategic
competition from a review of short time periods. Competitive dynamics is, as the name sug-
gests, a study of dynamic movement seen in long term, rather than the static results from the
short term analysis.
As we know from readings of management cultures, especially the US based management
culture tends to concentrate on the short term. However, the findings from this study suggest
that the long term concerns should also be monitored and addressed. Especially the firms
that function in markets where the product life cycles are short and the product needs to be
reinvented regularly could benefit from the review of the dynamic strategic direction of the
market.
Although this first sounds almost counter-intuitive; looking at the history, while the market
changes so quickly, this thesis has found that patterns of the competition are possible to
decipher and to some extent, even predict, from the flow of information between the firms.
Dyadic strategy building is based on the old proverb about knowing your enemy, and could
result in improvements in the firm’s global position.
7.3 Suggestions for further research
The empirical study in this thesis has been limited to the competitive dyad between the Xbox
and the PS3. As both firms’ decisions are certainly affected by the actions of the other gaming
devices, it would also be interesting to look into other relationships in the market. In effect
it was Nintendo Wii, which brought interactivity to the game consoles market, and pressured
both Sony and Microsoft to launch their interactive controllers PlayStation Move and Xbox
360 Kinect.
Examining the left-out factors marked in cursive in the figure 26 could possibly offer an av-
enue for a further study concentrating further on those resource similarity factors that affect
the awareness-motivation-capability framework in the game consoles market. Top manage-
ment team, management culture, global cultural differences, corporate strategy and subsidiary
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movements are all likely to bring in new challenges and details into competitive strategy
building with a specific rival.
Looking at the micro motives of the companies in specific situations could be another possible
opportunity for an extension of this study. Examining the places where the companies have
moved on to place a foothold attack in one area or retreated from a fight in another could
provide interesting new information about the behaviour of the companies. However, at least
in the case of the game consoles, gathering such data could prove to be challenging, as the
micro movements of two global giants are not documented in any single data source.
Another interesting angle to the strategy research is that of game theory (Camerer, 1991). For
example, competitive dynamics researchers tend to often refer to Bernheim and Whinston
(1990)’s model of multimarket contact and collusive behaviour, which utilizes Bertrand price
competition, and which could offer a relevant basis for a more mathematical approach in the
subject.
Finally, this thesis has found that Chernoff faces, although a refreshingly non-standard method
for graphing the data, do not help to solve the problems of the competitive dynamics mod-
elling completely. Thus the further studies should strive to improve and standardize the sta-
tistical methods used to model the competitive interactions.
In a world that seems to be progressing towards a more globally unified place to do business
in, the businesses take new forms, and the strategies of competition intensify and become
more complex. Because it is critical to understand these strategies and to come up with new
ones in order to capture more market share, or even to stay in the business in the long term, it
is also crucial to study the phenomena related to competitive dynamics further.
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